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Home : History & Biography : History Study Guides : American : The Revolutionary War (1775-1783) : The War in The South-After 1778
The War in The South-After 1778
Summary
After 1778 the war took on a distinctively international character. In 1778
France declared war on Britain, followed in 1779 and 1780 by Spain and the Dutch
Republic, respectively. Britain now had to fight on a battlefield that included
India, Gibraltar, the US, and the West Indies. Partially in response to this
turn of events and partially in response to the declining situation in the
North, the British turned their attention to the American South. The southern
ports, if controlled by the British, would provide the flexibility of movement
necessary to carry out such a geographically broad conflict. Additionally,
loyalist influences were far stronger in the South then they were in the North,
and the British counted on their support. The plan entailed seizing the major
southern ports and after establishing control of the South, working back toward
the North.
General Henry Clinton sailed from New York to Charleston, South Carolina in
pursuit of this goal. He brought with him 9,000 troops and took the Continental
garrison at the South Carolina capitol on May 12, 1780. Clinton, satisfied that
with loyalist support he could control the city, returned to New York with 3,000
men. He left the British troops in the South under the control of Lord
Charles Cornwallis. Cornwallis found that while loyalism was not as strong
as the British had hoped, there were significant numbers of Tories in the
Carolinas and in Georgia especially.
These loyalists quickly joined the royal militia and aided in the defense of
British strongholds and in the harassment of local Whigs. The Tories, long
oppressed by the dominant Whigs during the opening years of the revolution,
struck back with vigor, forming roaming mobs to terrorize patriot leaders. The
patriots formed their own bands and mobs in resistance. The first few months of
British occupation were characterized by small skirmishes between neighbors
divided over the cause of independence. After a short time of relatively
unfettered British domination and loyalist torment of southern patriots, the
Continental Army finally responded with large-scale military action.
Congress sent General Horatio Gates to command the southern forces in
opposition to the British occupation. However, he only had a small number of
trained Continentals under his command, thus his troops were comprised largely
of more poorly trained militiamen. On August 16, 1780, Gates attempted to take
the British and Tory camp at Camden, South Carolina. His forces, numbering
3,500 were crushed resoundingly by only 2,000 British troops. The less
experienced militiamen scattered and retreated after firing only one volley,
leaving the small Continental force to be routed. American losses are not known
for certain, but estimates as high as 800 killed are commonly accepted. The
British, on the other hand, only suffered 68 killed and 256 wounded. Horatio
Gates himself fled from the battlefield shortly after the fighting began. For
his failure, General George Washington immediately relieved Gates of command, and sent
Nathanael Greene to South Carolina in his place.
Commentary
Although the British could explain their shift in focus from North to South by
citing the practical need to locate their troops in a more flexible position
relative to their other major conflicts around the globe, many historians
believe the move South truly signified the frustrated effort to quell the
resistance in the North. Unable to halt the progress of the revolution through
direct conflict in the geographical center of the rebellion, the British moved
south, planning to take the hardest possible route back to the North. British
military officials decided on a move to the South as a last-ditch effort at
victory, expecting that the greater presence of loyalists in the region would
make it easier to conquer and hold their military targets.
While the British expectation of finding a significantly higher proportion of
loyalists in the Carolinas than they had found in the North turned out to be
correct, the British found far fewer than they had expected. Southern loyalism
had suffered a blow during the early years of the war, when Cherokee Indians had
attacked the American settlers, killing Whigs and Tories indiscriminately.
Additionally, attempts at political education undertaken by the patriots took
its toll slowly but surely, and the number of loyalists turned to the cause of
the revolution grew steadily throughout the opening years of the war.
Still, the war in the South was predominantly a civil war during the first three
months of British occupation. The American Tories, supplied and empowered by
the support of the British troops, did most of the fighting for the British/Tory
side during this time. Eager to get revenge on the Whigs, who had treated them
poorly during the war to this point, the Tories mobilized quickly and
ferociously. As a result, the war in the South was intensely personal in
nature. Individuals often took sides and actions based solely on personal
vendettas rather than politics, with many instances of individuals becoming avid
militants as a result of what they felt to be personal affronts. Many of these
instances involved individuals responding to personal vendettas in the form of
brutally violent revenge, such as hangings and executions.
The failure of Horatio Gates' Continental forces to end this situation was an
understandable outrage to the Continental leadership. His embarrassing defeat
both gave the British hope and crushed the sprit of many patriots in the North
and Mid-Atlantic who hoped the situation in the South was not as direly loyalist
as rumors often claimed. The Continentals saw in the move south a chance to
crush all remaining British hopes of victory. Instead, Gates had done just the
opposite. While it is true that many of his soldiers were poorly trained
militiamen, the resounding nature of the defeat at Camden suggested that poor
planning and cowardice had factored into the loss. Washington, furious, called
for Nathanael Greene to rectify the situation.
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