The failure of a supreme authority to regulate
interstate commerce became a problem because,
although Congress was endowed with the sole
authority to negotiate foreign treaties, it did not
have the power to control trade between individual
states and foreign countries. States were solely
granted the right to levy imposts on foreign
goods, and they freely interpreted this to mean
goods from other countries as well as other states
in the United States. States insisted on printing
their own paper money and requiring it in kind for
payment of tariffs of purchase of goods. Bordering
states that shared the same rivers struggled to
exert control by imposing competing tolls. In
addition to a variety of different customs
regulations and currencies, state governments
sought commercial advantage over other states, and
based their policies on what would bring their
state the biggest rewards, not what was best for
the common economic good.
These interstate trade wars developed because
states with clear commercial advantages abused
their power. The disadvantaged states without ports
could not import goods directly into their state
and had to rely on neighboring states with ports.
These neighboring states often charged to transport
goods either into or out of the state. The only
recourse for the states without ports was to
retaliate by enacting their own tariffs on imported
goods. Therefore, the consumer was caught up in a
confusing and costly interstate battle resulting
from interstate jealousies and a system of commerce
that lacked uniformity. Consumers, farmers, and
merchants bore the brunt of these policies, but
appeals for change accomplished nothing.
Committees of merchants organized to appeal for a
more regulated system of commerce. Nationalist
politicians did what they could to make
improvements to the system. Alexander Hamilton
tried in 1781, and again in 1783, to draft an
amendment that granted Congress the right to levy
and collect an impost. This would not only provide
some regulation to the world of trade, but would
also provide Congress with a much-needed source
of revenue. Many states were surprisingly eager to
relinquish their control of commerce in order to
relieve some of the confusion, but it required
unanimous approval before it could become law.
Unfortunately, Rhode Island opposed both measures,
insisting that this infringed upon the
sovereignty of the states. The inability of
Congress to make much needed change without a
unanimous decision, not to mention their inability
to regulate commerce, fueled interstate tension
further. Rhode Island especially irked the majority
of states for not graciously succumbing to the
desires of the other twelve states.
Rhode Island again became the source of interstate
frustration when it passed debt-repayment
laws that required all creditors to accept the
highly inflated and worthless Rhode Island
currency. This attempt to quickly pay of its debt
demonstrated a naivete about the fine points of
finance, and appalled commercial men in other
states. It would have been better for Rhode
Island's line of credit had the state tried to pay off the actual value it owed
over a longer period of time. Instead, creditors
from other nations and other states were forced
either to take full payment in paper currency, of a
greatly diminished value, or give up their
repayment altogether. Rhode Island established
criminal penalties for refusing to accept its
currency and removed the right to trial-by-jury in cases
related to debt-collection. Acting solely in its
own interest, Rhode Island jeopardized not only the
United States' line of credit with foreign
creditors but also threatened to remove civil liberties.
Without a strong central government to control the behavior of individual
states, there was no recourse when an individual
state acted against the general welfare of the
United States.
The same lack of "friendship" between states
existed between delegates to Congress as well.
Sometimes openly hostile to delegates from other
states, openly criticizing others in letters and
other public forums, the delegates did not behave
like friends, or even like polite acquaintances. A
general lack of camaraderie plagued Congress in the
form of low attendance and states refusing to
compromise their own best interest. Congress was
often unable to exert the few powers it did have to
sooth interstate rivalries simply because of lack
of a quorum. In other cases, Congress was unable to
act objectively because it was so easily
manipulated by powerful states. When appealed to by
one state, Congress had to carefully weigh that state's
influence (especially financial) when deciding
whether to intervene. For example, when Vermont,
which had been formed by land taken from New York,
appealed to Congress to be accepted as a new state,
New York withheld its requisitioned funds to
pressure Congress into deciding on its behalf. The
"perpetual union of firm friendship" lacked both the
friendship and the coercive power necessary to
regulate interstate relations. Relying on the pure
motives of states, motives that were in fact driven by self-interest and
jealousy, destroyed the possibility of a firm league of friendship.
Ironically, one of the only attempts of self-
regulation between two states actually succeeded in
becoming a uniform policy and became the first step
towards a revision of the Articles of
Confederation. This self-regulation was also
deemed technically illegal by the Articles, which
did not allow states to contract treaties outside
of the forum of Congress. Nevertheless, leaders
from Maryland and Virginia agreed to meet in
Alexandria to discuss a mutually agreed upon
regulation of commerce on the Potomac and Pocomoke
Rivers. As was typical of the time, the Virginia
delegation did not get the message and failed to
attend. When the Maryland delegates arrived with no
reception, they contacted two of the Virginia
delegates and persuaded them to go ahead with the
meeting anyway, which they did at Mount Vernon.
The results of the meeting went far beyond the original goals; not only did the
delegates resolve the dispute relating to the two rivers, they also established
a uniform policy of commerce and trade
regulations in all areas of exchange between the
two states. Additionally, their success inspired
them to call a convention of all states interested
in discussing issues of common commerce in
Annapolis. This Annapolis Convention is what eventually led to
the call for a Constitutional Convention in May
1787. Ironically, it seems that the states were
eager to befriend each other in order to work
towards their mutual interests, but somehow the
Articles reinforced jealousies rather than
effectively encouraging the friendship necessary to
enact uniform policies towards the common good.
