This revaluation of values effected by the Jews has happened so slowly that it
has not been noticed. Its crowning achievement was the development of
Christianity: Christian love, created by this burning hatred. Nietzsche sees
Jesus as the ultimate embodiment of these Jewish ideals, and his crucifixion as
the ultimate bait. All the opponents of the Jews might side with Jesus against
them, thereby adopting his and their Judeo-Christian moral code. With the
advent and success of Christianity, Nietzsche suggests, the reversal of the
moral code became complete: what was once "good" became "evil" and what was once
"bad" became "good."
Commentary
This section introduces the contrast between what Nietzsche calls elsewhere
"master morality" and "slave morality." Master morality is the morality of the
masters, the nobles, the warriors, who see themselves and their actions as good.
Thus, strength, power, health, wealth, and happiness are all considered "good."
These masters then perceive what Nietzsche calls a pathos of distance
between themselves and those who are poor, unhealthy, weak, or impotent. These
are all undesirable qualities, and so the masters dub them as "bad." This is
the contrast between "good" and "bad" that defines master morality.
Those opposed to the masters develop slave morality. In this passage, Nietzsche
identifies slave morality with a priestly caste, though he identifies it
elsewhere with the plebs or the slaves. These people are the poor, the
unhealthy, the weak, and the impotent, and they learn to hate and resent the
power and health of the masters. They dub their masters "evil" and call
themselves "good" by contrast. Thus, slave morality is characterized by a
contrast between "good" and "evil."
This brief sketch is over-simplified, but is meant mostly to get some of the
terms clarified and out in the open. A great deal of what follows in later
sections will help to refine these crude definitions. The contrast between
master morality and slave morality is one of the more well known aspects of
Nietzsche's thought, but also one more liable to mislead. It is easy, though
naive, to see Nietzsche as setting up this contrast so as to praise master
morality and disparage the Judeo-Christian slave morality that dominates his
(and our own) time. Careless readings of Nietzsche have also led to his being
understood as an anti-Semite or a Nazi who encourages the Aryan "master" races
to do away with Jewish slave morality.
Let us begin trying to unpack this section by recalling Nietzsche's criticism of
the English psychologists as lacking a historical spirit. Because contemporary
English moral philosophy was dominated by utilitarianism, these psychologists
interpreted the entire history of morality in terms of utility: the "good" and
the "useful" were originally one and the same in their reading. Nietzsche is
disappointed with their lack of a historical sense because they are unable to
rise above the moral biases of their time: they see history through the lens of
their own morality. This lack of perspective can be problematic when doing
history, but when trying to decipher the history of morals itself it can be
disastrous.
Nietzsche encourages a reading of history that detaches itself as much as
possible from moral valuations. This claim will have to be refined in the
commentary on the following section, as we shall see Nietzsche come down very
harshly against the ressentiment of slave morality, but it should be
sufficient for the present discussion. So, for instance, simply because
Nietzsche sees slave morality as born out of Jewish hatred, we should not
necessarily see him as speaking out against slave morality, the Jews, or even
hatred. With Nietzsche, the matter is rarely as simple as "this is good and
this is bad": after all, he is attempting a critique of what we should call
"good" and "bad" in the first place. The same intensity that creates a burning
hatred in the priestly caste is also the one thing that Nietzsche claims makes
humans "interesting." It gives us a depth not found in master morality, and it
develops the concept of evil, a concept not found in any animals. For the most
part, Nietzsche seems to be exhibiting a great deal of preference for master
morality, but it seems he would also argue that these masters are not
"interesting."
