Section 15 provides textual evidence from early Christian writings, particularly
Tertullian, to show hatred and ressentiment being paraded as "Christian
love." These writers expend a great deal of voyeuristic energy inventing all
sorts of tortures for sinners not welcomed into the kingdom of heaven.
Nietzsche concludes with the remark that the struggle between "good and
evil" and "good and bad" is one of the oldest and greatest on earth, and
that the "good and evil" of ressentiment has unquestionably come
out on top. He asks, however, if there might be a resurgence of the
overthrown master morality, suggesting that we might will this with all
our might.
Commentary
One of the greatest deceptions of language, according to Nietzsche, is the
subject-predicate form of grammar. Because all sentences are divided into a
subject and a predicate, we are led to believe that there are actors (subjects)
and deed (predicates) and that the two can be separated. As a result, we come
to think of killing as something distinct from a bird of prey, something that it
does. Nietzsche points out that grammar would similarly suggest to us that
flashing is something distinct from lightning, something that it does.
And just as there is no lightning distinct from the flash, Nietzsche suggests
that there is no bird of prey distinct from the killing.
This argument does not simply suggest that killing is in a bird of prey's
"nature" and that "it wouldn't be a bird of prey if it didn't kill things." In
Nietzschean metaphysics, there is no such thing as the bird of prey as common
wisdom would understand it. Gilles Deleuze interprets Nietzsche as suggesting
that nothing exists but forces. We might simplify Deleuze's analysis by
suggesting that only verbs truly exist: nouns and subjects are just the
conveniences of grammar. While we might talk about a bird of prey killing a
lamb, really there is just one force acting upon another. Of course, using
"force" as a noun is a mistake, as it simply substitutes one noun for another.
This discussion of metaphysics gets very tricky very quickly, and because we are
so accustomed to thinking in terms of subjects and predicates, it is very
difficult to imagine a world that consists solely of forces acting on one
another. Rather than dwell too long on this question, we leave the metaphysics
here, encouraging the reader to sort out what consequences this metaphysics
might have on our concept of personal identity, epistemology, and much else
besides, and to ask whether Nietzsche's account is plausible and how it might be
tested. For now, we will focus on the immediate consequences for the moral
philosophy Nietzsche is discussing in this essay.
At first glance, it might appear that Nietzsche is denying free will: we cannot
hold the bird of prey accountable since it could not act otherwise. On this
interpretation, Nietzsche would essentially be claiming that none of us are free
to do anything and none of us can be held accountable for anything. This
interpretation is about 10% true. To claim that the bird of prey has no free
will is about as opposite to Nietzsche's position as can be. Nietzsche would
rather claim that there is no bird of prey independent of its will. To talk
about a bird of prey as "having" free will is again to make the subject-
predicate error. Will is not a "thing" that one "has": a will is, essentially,
what one is. The bird of prey is its will, and that will wills the death of the
lamb. Not to kill the lamb would require a different will, that is, a different
creature altogether. If we say the bird of prey should not have killed the
lamb, we are saying that the bird of prey should have been a different animal.
