It is possible to have an inner monologue without speaking, but it is not possible to only have inner monologues without ever speaking. Similarly, orders can be disobeyed, but there would be no such thing as orders if they were never obeyed. Our concepts

must be grounded in certain regular practices for them to have a sense. In the absence of criteria based on our everyday practices (e.g. asking whether a stove feels pain), we do not have a false picture, but rather no picture at all.

There are no criteria for identifying private sensations (e.g. "is this pain my pain?"). We can imagine odd circumstances in which I might ask, "Is this foot my foot?" (e.g. if it is numb and I see it next to someone else's feet). But we cannot im

agine circumstances in which I might ask, "Is this sensation my sensation?" because there is no way of identifying what I mean by "this": I am not singling it out against other possible candidates.

The problem with "this" works similarly for "I" and "here": they are not names for people and places. Questions of personal identity are confused because they attempt to single something out as "I," when in fact "I" (like "this") is not the sort of thing

we can talk about in terms of singling out.

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