The laminar endurance of the Leviathan has its troubling aspects, despite its ability to provide safety and freedom. When Hobbes makes the subject responsible for authoring the actions of the representative, a total acceptance of the status quo is cemented. Of course, this is for what Hobbes aims, and the logic of his own terms is extremely robust. But there is no possibility for civil change when the actions of the representative must always be accepted as having been, in fact, committed by the constituents. Hobbes tries to strengthen his claim with an analogy: He says that a state's subjects determine the actions of their sovereign in the same way that the kinetics of external material bodies, by the transfer of motion hierarchically from one body to the next, result in human bodily sensations, perceptions, and thought. But even if this argument is accepted, the analogy made with the relation between the human body and the sovereign representative does not hold up to scrutiny, because the individual constituent does not directly cause the actions of the sovereign in the same manner as the action of matter causes human perceptions. Hobbes's analogy seems to suggest that the actions of the sovereign are caused by material motions--just as human perceptions in general are caused by material motions--and not by his human subjects--although these subjects may have a certain amount of influence.

Despite Hobbes's confidence that the sovereign's power will remain paternal in nature, he provides no logical guarantee that it will not devolve into a tyrannical or despotic mode of rule. Hobbes writes that when the sovereign no longer protects the security of the commonwealth, the subjects are no longer obliged to obey him. But the tightly interconnected body of the Leviathan, in which the smallest members are responsible for actions of the entire figure, resists governmental change even in cases when the abuses within the Leviathan are worse than within the state of nature.