In contrast, if an action only indirectly affects society without violating any
fixed obligation, then "the inconvenience is one which society can afford to
bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom." Society has a
person's entire childhood to nurture values; if the person fails to accept those
values, or remains immature, it is society's own fault. No further influence is
necessary. Also, if an action is harmful then people will see its negative
effects, and this should be enough of an example to them of why they should not
act in such a way.
Mill says the strongest argument against interference, though, is that when
society does interfere, it will likely do so wrongly. He writes, "there is no
parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of
another who is offended at his holding it." Mill argues that there is a
universal tendency of people to extend the bounds of "moral police" unjustly. He
writes about how a Muslim majority might insist that pork not be eaten in their
country, or that married clergy be punished in Spain. He writes, "we must
beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice
the application to ourselves." If people want to be able to impose their
morality, they must be willing to accept the imposition by others. Mill
complains about unjust violations of freedom such as the banning of alcohol, the
banning of recreation on the Sabbath, and the persecution of Mormons for
polygamy. People can preach against such activities, and try to change people's
minds, but they should not be coercive.
Commentary
Mill spends significant time in this chapter defending and delineating his "harm
principle": that actions can only be punished when they harm others. Perhaps
the most basic issue in this chapter, then, is whether Mill's harm principle
actually makes sense. Mill acknowledges that people are not fully isolated from
society, and that their actions can affect others. In principle then, one could
make a case that any particular activity causes such harm to other people that
the need to respect individuality is outweighed. Is it unfairly arbitrary that
Mill therefore limits social intervention to those actions that directly violate
obligations? Perhaps more importantly, does Mill leave too much room for
someone to say that it would be acceptable to limit liberty any time it could
harm society in any way?
In response to these questions, Mill would likely remind the reader that his
approach is operating under a broadly construed conception of social good. In
Chapter 3, he tried to show many of the beneficial effects of nonconformity.
Any social interest in restricting actions would therefore have to overcome the
broad social value of individuality. While Mill's utilitarian approach does
leave open the possibility that social interest could require major limitations
on freedom, his discussions in previous chapters about the social value
of liberty makes such a possibility unlikely. The reason his standard for
"harm" is so high is that the good that comes from individuality is so socially
beneficial.
In many ways, Mill uses the same arguing technique in this chapter that he did
in defending freedom of opinion in Chapter 2. Mill points out that societies
frequently declare perfectly legitimate activities to be immoral. Therefore, if
a person wants to say that it is acceptable to punish bad activities, he must
also accept that others have the right to do the same to him. Mill starts with
examples that would seem obvious to his audience, like the unfairness of banning
pork in Muslim countries, to make much more radical claims, such as the
unfairness of banning polygamy. Thus, the fallibility of society is an
important aspect of Mill's defense of liberty of action.
Mill's discussion is also interesting in the ways in which he leaves some
openings for social criticism of actions. Such criticism is appropriate when it
cannot be helped; it is simply natural that people will find some activities to
be distasteful and will therefore judge the action inappropriate. However, Mill
sets boundaries on any punitive action emerging from this criticism. Just as
Mill believes opinions must be free while actions are subject to at least some
regulation, he gives free rein to criticism while limiting punishment, an
action.
