Analysis
After advancing his theory of how sense-data create the
physical world, Russell abandoned it in future works and reverted
to the notion that physical objects could legitimately be inferred
from sensory experience. This was partially due to scientific advances
in physics and human physiology, which were asserting that perception
is, in fact, caused by the effects of the physical world on our sense
organs. Russell also sensed other difficulties in his theories on physics
and perception. For one, his notion of sensibilia is difficult to
establish: what, exactly, does it mean for there to be “unsensed sense-data”?
How can there be an element of perception when no one is present
to do the perceiving? Russell was unable to adequately describe
his system of private and public spaces or to explain how sense-data
and sensibilia interact with that system. In later work like The
Analysis of the Mind (1921), Russell stops treating sense-data
and the act of sensation as separate entities. He does, however,
maintain the classic empiricist position that physical objects are
not directly knowable; only their sensory effects (what he took
to calling percepts, as opposed to sense-data)
are available to us. Eventually, Russell abandoned his inquiries
into the relationship of matter and perception, though he continued
to work in other areas of epistemology.
Critics also found flaws with Russell’s presentation of
logical atomism, which was often sketchy in areas. His former student
Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example, disagreed with the idea that logical atomism
should be tied to empiricism, and in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein
treated logical atomism as a purely formal theory. Critics have
also taken issue with how Russell defines the “simple” elements
of the world’s structure. Russell says that the basic atomic facts
of the world with which we can become acquainted are of two kinds:
particulars and universals. Particulars are individual instances
of sense-data, whereas universals are concepts that apply to many
objects. These include qualities (like redness, softness, heaviness)
and temporal and spatial relations (before, on top of, next to).
Russell contends that particulars and universals are atomic “simples”—that
is, they are finite and individual and cannot be analyzed or broken
down further. However, it is difficult to see how this definition
could apply to a universal like “redness.” The very concept of redness
requires us to compare different objects and classify them as similar;
this being so, it is impossible for “redness” to be an independent
entity.
Other critics have refuted Russell’s logical atomism in
myriad ways, many of which are too complex to cover here. Although
Russell’s presentation of logical atomism may have proved untenable,
it remains an important moment in the history of philosophy. Like
the Principia Mathematica—another of Russell’s
projects that eventually proved largely unjustifiable—Russell’s
defense of logical atomism is spurred by an intense interest in
justification. Russell’s work throughout his career can be characterized
by an extreme reluctance to believe any proposition without a firm,
sound reason to do so. Logical atomism was one of the earliest manifestations
of analytic philosophy, which (in its most general sense) holds
that philosophy should aspire to the precision and exactitude of
the sciences. As Russell was one of the founders of analytic philosophy,
his work inspired philosophers to rigorously examine their own assumptions and
to avoid taking seemingly self-evident truths for granted. It is this
dedication to constant, consistent analysis that is Russell’s greatest
legacy to philosophy.
