In the last segment of his argument, Sartre expands on
the for-itself as a being of agency, action, and creation and a
being devoid of concrete foundation. To escape its own nothingness,
the for-itself strives to absorb the in-itself, or even, in more
profane terms, to consume it. Ultimately, however, the in-itself
can never be possessed. Just as the for-itself will never realize
the union of for-itself and in-itself, neither will it succeed in
apprehending or devouring the alien object. Thus, at the summation
of Sartre’s polemic, an incredible sense of hopelessness dominates
the discussion: I am a nothingness, a lack, dehumanized by the other
and deceived even by myself. Yet, as Sartre continually emphasizes,
I am free, I am transcendent, I am consciousness, and I make the
world. How to reconcile these two ostensibly unreconcilable descriptions
of human ontology is a question Sartre does not attempt to definitively
answer. This avoidance of reaching a definitive point of philosophic
conclusion is in many ways intentional, however, in keeping with
both Sartre’s personal style and the existentialist maxim that there
are no theories that can make a claim to universality.
As Sartre outlines in the conclusion to his work, perhaps
the most essential characteristic of being is its intrinsic absence
of differentiation and diversity. Being is complete fullness of
existence, a meaningless mass of matter devoid of meaning, consciousness,
and knowledge. Consciousness enters the world through the for-itself and
with it brings nothingness, negation, and difference to what was once
a complete whole of being. Consciousness is what allows the world
to exist. Without it, there would be no objects, no trees, no rivers,
and no rocks: only being. Consciousness always has intentionality—that
is, consciousness is always conscious of something. It thus imposes
itself on being-in-itself, making consciousness the burden of the
for-itself and of all being. On a similar note, the for-itself at
all times depends on the in-itself for its existence. In Sartre’s ontology,
consciousness knows what it is only through the knowledge of what
it is not. Consciousness knows it is not a being-in-itself and thus
knows what it is, a nothingness, a nihilation of being. Yet, to
Sartre, despite the fact that the for-itself is nothing, it exists
only in its relation to being and thus is its own type of is.
Analysis
From the beginning of Being and Nothingness,
Sartre displays his debt to Nietzsche through his rejection of the
notion of any transcendent reality or being that humans can know
which might lie behind or beneath the appearances that make up reality.
That is, the experience of appearances is reality.
Although this does imply an emptiness, Sartre does not see it as
a negative truth. Freed of the search for some essential form being,
we, as conscious beings (all beings-for-itself), are empowered in
knowing that our personal, subjective experience of the world is
all the truth there is. We are the ultimate judge of being and nonbeing,
truth and falsity.
The key concepts of Sartre’s vision of the world are the
being-in-itself and the being-for-itself. One way of understanding
how they relate to each other is to think of being-in-itself as
another word for object and the being-for-itself
as another word for subject. The being-in-itself
is something that is defined by its physical characteristics, whereas
the subject is defined by consciousness, or nonphysical and nonessentializable
attributes. These concepts overlap to a certain degree, since the
being-for-itself, or subject, is also possessed of some of the physical
self, or some of the attributes of an object or being-in-itself.
It thus follows that sometimes a being-for-itself can be harmfully
and mistakenly regarded as a being-in-itself.
The interaction of beings possessed of consciousness
is a major focus for Sartre, and as he describes a being-for-itself
to interact with another being-for-itself, the key concepts are
“the gaze” and “the other.” Without question, in Sartre’s view the
gaze of the other is alienating. Our awareness of being perceived
not only causes us to deny the consciousness and freedom inherent
to us but also causes us to recognize those very qualities in our
counterpart. Consequently, we are compelled to see the other who
looks at us as superior, even if we recognize his gaze as ultimately
dehumanizing and objectifying. In response to the gaze of the other,
we will assert ourselves as free and conscious and attempt to objectify
the individual who objectifies us, thus reversing the relationship.
The pattern of relations Sartre describes appears frequently in
society. The assertion of freedom and transcendence by one party
often results in the repression of those conditions in another.
Race-based slavery and the treatment of women by men in patriarchal
societies are two obvious examples.
Sartre brings up the ethical implications of the ontological
vision set forth in Being in Nothingness only at
the end of the work. In later works, notably the famous lecture
“The Humanism of Existentialism,” Sartre attempts to outline a philosophy
of ethics based on an existentialist study of the nature of being.
In short, he argues that values are never objective, as they are
created by the choices and actions of free individuals. Herein lies
the room for hope that Sartre inserts into a work so full of nothingness
and lack: freedom is humanity’s curse as well as its blessing, and
what we make of that freedom is our own. In it lies great and indeterminate
possibility.
