Summary
Soon after the capitulation of Fort Necessity, the British crown and
Parliament learned that 78 French troops had been deployed to attack the British
fort Oswego in Canada. Parliament responded by allocating more money to the
colonies for the purpose of funding an expanded militia. They also sent British
regiments to the colonies. In February 1755, the first British general to ever
set foot in the colonies, Edward Braddock, arrived in Virginia.
Braddock was a general in the tradition of British generals, well versed in
European warfare and completely ignorant of the possibilities and necessities of
New World warfare. Soon after reaching shore, Braddock crafted a three-pronged
strategy for defeating the French. The Massachusetts regiments were sent to
reinforce the defenses at Oswego, with the expectation that they would then go
on to capture Fort Niagara on the south shore of Lake Erie. Colonel William
Johnson was assigned to capture Fort Frederick at Crown Point, on the banks of
Lake Champlain. Braddock himself was to take Fort Duquesne in Pennsylvania.
The first battle after arrival of Braddock actually had nothing to do with
Braddock's plan. In May and June of 1755, about 2,000 militiamen moved into
French controlled Acadia (now Nova Scotia), and quite easily brought about the
fall of the region in May and June of 1755. Many of the battles were small and
almost uncontested, as the region was sparsely occupied. Some of the forts were
won after a few days of musket fire, without any direct conflict between the
troops. The governor of Nova Scotia, Charles Lawrence, sent about 6,000
Acadians, some half of those living in the region, to the colonies after the
battle. Quite a few of these Acadians settled in New Orleans, where they became
known as "Cajuns" and created an earthy, rich culture of their own in the United
States. For the French, the loss of Acadia certainly stung, but it was no great
tragedy; Acadia had little strategic value.
The first significant battle of 1755 was Braddock's battle for Fort Duquesne.
Despite the fact that the British outnumbered the French by two to one, 2,200
men to 1,000 men, the French won in a colossal rout. In approaching the fort,
Braddock arranged his men to cross the Monongahela River in columns, thereby
allowing the French to easily ambush the British forces while using the
surrounding trees as cover. In all, the British lost 977 men to the French's 9.
Braddock was also killed. The British disaster would have been even worse had
the French, shocked by their easy victory, decided to pursue the retreating
army.
When news of Braddock's defeat reached the regiments approaching Fort
Oswego, morale sank and there were many desertions. The attack on Fort Niagara
was deferred until the next year, and the troops reinforcing Oswego were left
with the prospect of facing an invigorated and more-experienced French army.
The loss at Fort Duquesne sent the British forces into a tailspin from which
they did not quickly recover; a three-year period the British termed "the years
of losing."
Commentary
The story of General Edward Braddock's defeat can be interpreted
as a lack of cultural knowledge. Braddock's fighting style was suited to the
plains of England and Europe, where columns of men in red jackets marching in an
intimidating line towards the enemy was designed to create the image of an
impenetrable force. In Europe, this strategy worked. However, the regions in
which the French and Indian War took place were not plains; the battles of the
war took place in mountains, forests, and fierce wildernesses. Trees, rivers,
waterfalls, mountains, and hills twisted the landscape, making straight-on
combat virtually impossible and highly unlikely. The type of battle most
suited to this natural landscape was not Braddock's style, but rather sniping
gunfire from the cover of trees, ambushes, surprise attacks, and guerrilla
warfare. One of the primary reasons the French were able to hold an advantage
in the war for four years despite being outnumbered and underfunded, was their
tactical understanding of the landscape, and their ability and willingness to
act on that tactical understanding. The French owed a great deal of their
understanding to their Indian allies, who taught them invaluable things about
fighting in the American landscape.
The example of Braddock demonstrates how far the British were in the early
stages of the war from comprehending the realities of warfare in the colonies.
It was only after Lord Pitt took charge of the army and reorganized it
according to the necessities of the colonies that the British began to turn the
tide of the war.
