Summary (920-1250)
Context
Important Terms, People, and Events
Timeline
Getting There: Byzantium, 650-870
Byzantium Triumphant, Byzantium Faltering: 960-1071
Germany, 920-1075: The Saxon Empire to the Investiture Controversy
England from Saxon Kingdom to Norman Conquest: 925-1135
The Crusades: 1095-1204
Byzantium, 1081-1261: Decay, Defeats, Latin Betrayal, and Survival
France & England, 987-1226: Capets and Angevins
France, 1226-1270: Louis IX
Germany in the Hohenstaufen Era: 1137-1250
Christianity: Expansion, Monastic and Papal Reform, Clash with Secular Rulers (910-1122)
Reconquista, 1000-1250
Christianity, 1130-1244: Spiritual Invigoration, the Papal Monarchy, and Heresy
Study & Essay
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Further Reading
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High Middle Ages (1000-1200)
Germany, 920-1075: The Saxon Empire to the Investiture Controversy
Summary
When later Carolingians had not been able to exert royal
power or defend Eastern Francia against Magyars
and Vikings, political units began to collapse on
to pre-Charlemagne lines--Saxony, Franconia, Lorraine, Swabia,
and Bavaria. Their leaders took the title of count and then duke,
following the western custom. From the 870s, they usurped the
royal demesne, patronized churches, made the king's officials dependent
on them, and tried to appoint bishops. When the weak Louis the
Child (899-911) died, they tried to leave the throne vacant, as
he was the last Carolingian ruler in the East. The Church, however,
wanted a strong monarchy that would guarantee order and their privileges,
as opposed to five warring dukes. Also, Magyar incursions required
some coordinated response. Desiring a weak sovereign, the Dukes
elected Conrad of Franconia (911-918). He was too weak
though, not stopping the Magyars, and allowing Lorraine to fall
to the French King, Charles the Simple.
Henry I of Saxony, also known as Henry the Fowler (r.
919-936) was next. He was the first non-Frankish king of Germany.
Henry the Fowler founded the Saxon dynasty and allowed dukes leeway
in their own regions, as long as they recognized his status as
king. He did insist, however, on three monarchical prerogatives:
1) as the king's generals, dukes were to recruit forces and bring
an army to wherever the king was campaigning; 2) Henry gradually
brought the nomination of counts, and especially bishops--the bases
of local government--back into the king's hands; 3) he slowed or
even turned back the alienation of the royal demesne from the king
to the nobles. Lorraine, Swabia, and Bavaria proved recalcitrant.
He annexed the latter and appointed an allied Franconian as duke
in Swabia, yet Bavaria remained elusive. By 924, Magyar invasions had
recommenced. Initially defending mostly Saxony, by 933 Henry felt
ready to refuse further Magyar tribute demands. In the ensuing
933 Battle of Unstrut, Henry's forces utterly defeated a large
Hungarian expedition, increasing the crown's prestige. Building
up a cavalry, Henry also inflicted damage on the Danes before his
936 death.
Henry the Fowler's son, Otto I (r. 936-973), insisted
on maintaining a strong monarchy, wanting to effect his will in
all regions. A revolt immediately broke out on the parts of dukes
wary of growing central power. When the duke of Franconia died
in the hostilities, Otto annexed it directly to his own Saxony.
In the latter area, he granted much land to his ally Magnus Billung,
but kept the ducal title, thus maintaining control of two of the
fundamental German duchies. He was able to bring other dukes to
heel by 938. Throughout, he relied on the Church to increase his
power. He chose all the bishops and abbots, increasing their powers
and lands, thereby gaining allies whose allegiance he required.
They were also given count's rights over neighboring lands. Monarchy-oriented
in any event, the clerics became a basis of Ottonian power, supporting
him with troops when necessary. In other areas, Otto relied on
family members. In 947, he gave Bavaria's duchy to his brother,
while Lorraine went to Conrad the Red, a brother in law. Continuing
a German monarchical tradition, in the late 940s, Otto led conquest-conversion
efforts among the Wends (Slavs) beyond the Elbe, establishing new
bishoprics in all areas.
The German king was often unable to trust even his dukes.
Thus, Otto, as Charlemagne before him, was drawn into Italy.
When Rudolph II of Burgundy died in 937, the Italian king Hugh
of Arles had tried to occupy it, and was fought off by Otto. In
949, the Duke of Bavaria seized Aquileia, and began to rival Otto's
power. The next year, unexpected deaths resulted in the North-Central
Italian Kingdom falling to Adelaide, a woman other dukes thought
it possible to conquer. Thus in 950, Italian notable Berengar
was elected King of the Lombards and captured Adelaide and her
lands. At this point, Liudolf, Duke of Swabia, and Otto's own
son crossed into Italy as her savior, challenging Otto's rule.
To prevent further conflict and claims of dukes to prominence,
in 951 Otto established direct authority over Lombardy, placing
bishops in control of secular affairs in their dioceses, expanding
the German model. He was not able to assume the crown himself,
as a German revolt led by Swabian and Bavarian dukes required his
attention. His son in particular felt snubbed. As well, Otto
faced renewed Magyar troubles and resoundingly defeated them in
955 at Lechfeld. The pope did not look unkindly at the Magyar
incursions into Germany; he wanted to avoid too close a German
embrace.
Yet in 962, as part of a power-play against a rival Roman
noble ecclesiastical faction (the same Baerengar of Friuli who
had made off with Adelaide), Pope John XII crowned Otto Holy Roman Emperor.
Though the German king had sent forces to aid the Pope in 961,
he rebelled against Otto when the new Emperor indicated he meant
to rule as well as reign. Upon hearing news of the revolt--including
John's appeal to Berengar and the Magyars, Otto held a synod which
deposed the Pope and appointed a new one, Leo VIII. While Otto
swore to uphold Papal authority in the Papal Sates, Leo in turn
undertook that no Pope would be consecrated in the future before
the Emperor's approval. As for the people and nobles of Rome,
they refused Leo, requiring a further Ottonian intervention in
964-965. Around the same time, the German Emperor was able to come
to terms with Constantinople regarding the imperial title, ending
years of desultory combat in central-southern Italy. Having married
the Byzantine Princess Theophano, Otto's son Otto II succeeded
to the throne in 973.
Otto II was not exceedingly successful, though he did
maintain his predecessors' internal policies. While attempting
to supercede Byzantine power in southern Italy, he met Muslim opposition
from Sicily and was defeated resoundingly by them in 982. Inspired,
the Slavs beyond the Elbe were able to re-conquer all lands to
the Oder, reinstituting paganism in the area and destroying the
ecclesiastical administration by 983. When Otto II died that year,
his son Otto III was elected, with two female regents. Not feeling
threatened, and bound to the monarchy by familial or personal ties,
the duchies did not revolt. Otto III died in 1002 at the age of
twenty-two, thus ruling for only a short while as an adult. He
was intensely spiritual, stewarding over monastic reform, and engaging
the brightest clerics of the West as tutors. One, Gerbert of Aurillac,
he nominated to be Pope Sylvester II (999-1003). Finally, when
granted the title servus apostolorum, servant
of the apostles, the German monarchy gained influence over the
Christianizing populations of Poland and Hungary, who had accepted
Papal authority. Having no son, Otto was succeeded by Henry II
(r. 1002-1024), the head of a younger branch of the Saxon dynasty.
With his lands and authority centered in Bavaria, Henry II was
never able to assert total control over the Saxons, and continually
dealt with mini-revolts during his time as king, in addition to
Italian campaigns.
In 1024, the German monarchy passed to a new dynasty,
the Salians, as the new King Conrad II of Franconia came from the
original Salian Franks' ancestral homeland. As was custom, he
was elected by the kingdom's prelates and secular nobility. A
rising group among the latter were the fursten,
or princes. Not necessarily familially related to the Saxon kings,
they had been granted lands in different parts of the realm as
yet another counterbalance to the dukes. They held lands in a
non-feudal manner. Magnus Billung had been one such individual
favored by Otto I and his family had expanded their possessions
and powers to such a degree by 1024 that they were quasi-ducal
in power. These fursten were important, necessary
allies of the king. Conrad was able to deal with both them and
the dukes, as a strong military leader and aggressive political opportunist.
While he may have consented to inalienability of feudal fiefs
and the heredity of vassalage, he took advantage of the vacancy
of the Burgundy crown in 1033 to annex the region, becoming its
king. He also scored victories over the Poles, requiring their
recognition of his suzerainty. Finally, as a counterweight to dukes
and fursten, Conrad inaugurated a new social class
called ministeriales. Peasants of the royal domains
from serf background, they were trained as knights or administrators,
providing a body of support and civil servants linked to no one
but the king. Conrad's son Henry III (r. 1039-1056) continued
this process. Early in his reign, victories over Hungary and Bohemia
established theses areas as German fiefs, where monarchical power
was high. Also, along with the home possession of Franconia, Swabian
lands slowly accrued to the crown. Henry wanted to assert control
on southern Saxony and Thuringia, and chose as his method the construction
of royal castles garrisoned by ministeriales.
In this way, Billung power was encroached upon, as ducal power
in Saxony began to revert to the crown. By 1046, Germany had been
entirely pacified under the monarchy.
Unlike his rustic father, Henry was a Christian deeply
concerned with the spiritual health of his domains as well as with
that of the Papacy in Rome, still a German dependency. Regarding
the latter, it was in a desperate state. Given the distance of
the German Emperor from Rome, the city's nobility had taken to
building urban castles from which they monopolized Church positions.
The Tusculum family had produced Popes Benedict VIII (1012-24)
and John XIX (1024-32). They also had Benedict IX installed, yet
in 1045 a rival family, the Crescentii, rebelled, setting up an
anti-pope, Sylvester III. The anti-pope was forced to flee, yet
continued to call himself pope. In 1036, Benedict retired in favor
of his godfather Gregory VI, but tried to reclaim the position soon
after. At this time, Henry the German king decided to tidy up
the mess, and held the 1046 synod of Sutri. All three popes were
deposed, and a reforming German bishop was appointed as Clement
II (1046-47). Though opposed by Italians as well as some pro-imperial
prelates who felt that only God could judge a Pope, the Emperor
was supported by many clerics, among whom reformers such as Cardinal
Humbert numbered. Thus, from the late 1040s, with the Imperially supported
enthronement of Pope Leo IX (1048-1054), the Papacy itself would
turn to reforming the Church as a whole.
Henry IV (1056-1106) succeeded his father at the age of
six, and a long regency ensued under his mother and the Cologne
Archbishop. During this period, lay magnates tried to recoup losses
to their power under his father and grandfather. Certain of the
young king's officials even supported the nobles effort, to their
own benefit. Upon reaching majority in 1065, Henry IV began to
reacquire monarchical authority. In the process, he cultivated
the ministeriales as well as the townsfolk of the
emerging cities. Clerics were also important to him, yet growing
Papal pretensions to secular power paved the way for a major imperial-papal
confrontation in the mid 1070s. Henry's reassertion of kingly
power did not go unopposed. The Saxons in particular resented
the Franconian king's encroachments, and only at the Battle of Homburg
in 1075 did they submit to him. At this point a major
disagreement with Pope Gregory VII intersected with
political jockeying in Germany.
Commentary
The term "Ottonian System" has been used to describe the
method of governance employed by kings of the Saxon dynasty, distinguishing
it from the feudalism of the French type. In broadest terms, the German
monarchical idea was that "the king should govern his kingdom through
the clergy, and that he should appoint them himself." When German
kings looked west to France,
they saw a realm that was cut into regions controlled by secular
feudal counts and dukes who were as powerful, or even more powerful,
than the Capetian king. Duchies were hereditary, and the best
the French King could hope for was to become a legitimate part of
the feudal system, kept in place not by his own power, but through
the system's own needs. German kings wanted none of this, and
their desires coincided with their reality: the indigenous German
nobility was not nearly as powerful as were the French dukes.
Since Otto I and his successors held as their goal, in modern terms,
a strong, independent executive able to exert his will on the local
level through officers directly loyal to him, they found the Church
as an ally. The Church had always supported a sovereign for the
order he could provide, and German kings always valued the Carolingian
model of state-church symbiosis, with monarchical control. Thus,
Otto and his successors endowed churches and monasteries with great expanses
of land and funds, and granted them 'immunity'-- they were now
legally and fiscally off-limits to the dukes and counts the German
Kings wanted to keep down. Thus, while Otto gave up rights of
jurisdiction and tax gathering to abbots and bishops, what he relinquished
in fact was very little. Had he bestowed these lands on counts
and dukes 'acting in his name', it would be more than likely that
the individual nobles would use them as tools to aggrandize their
own power, making it hereditary, and reducing the reach of the
king. Instead, because it was the German King who most often appointed
the abbots and bishops, very rarely were these clerics able to
establish anything like hereditary dynasties, since the Church
as a whole was eliminating clerical marriage, with the crown's
support. Capitalizing on the structures of the Church, and his
own power in regard to it, Otto created a cadre of literate administrators
loyal to him. The clergy, for their part, considered that support
for the kingdom was in turn support for the Church--the king was
liberal in his endowment of Christian works, and these clerics
shared the ideal of a church-state symbiosis, where the king advocated
for the clergy against rapacious nobles. In fact, the kings maintained
most of the control--Churches could not dispose of lands granted
to them as they saw fit, and could not sell them or alienate them
without royal approval. Also, the kings did not give up tax revenues,
in that the churches and abbeys in question paid a yearly tribute
for their lands. Further, German kings also received military
muscle in return, as they demanded that prelates at the least supply,
and hopefully lead, armed contingents on royal campaigns. In exchange,
conquests of Slav territories were accompanied by state-supported
missionary efforts and the establishment of new bishoprics. The
final step in all this was the German Emperor's assertion past
the 950s that he could appoint popes. Otto I did this with Leo
VIII in 963, and then went to Italy in force. The practice continued
into the 1000s, when Otto III appointed Sylvester II, and extended
to the 1050s, with Leo IX.
The relation of German King to the pope hints at the problematic aspect
of the "Ottonian System." It would run into trouble at that point
when the Papacy began to assert itself. When the prelates of the
Church felt that they had the right to elect their leader, Imperial appointment
of popes would cause friction with the German King. Further, as
the German King supported the Church and allowed it to improve
its central administration, Popes would become more insistent that
they were better-equipped to appoint bishops and high abbots--the
very officers the German kings needed to control for their administration
to bypass the secular nobles. Any reforming clerical movement
would come to insist on these prerogatives as a natural extension
of a program of putting the Church's house in order. As a matter
of fact, the Reform Movement in the Church, beginning with Cluny,
and extending throughout the monasteries of Western and Central
Europe, proceeded into the ranks of the 'secular' clergy by the
1000s, and invigorated the Papacy as well. It is no coincidence
that popes such as Gregory VII made the claims they did when they
did--it was a natural product of Church reform. Ironically, by
supporting Church reform all over Germany as a way to undercut
noble-clerical alliances and feudal localization of power, German
kings encouraged the emergence of those very popes who came to
challenge their rights of investiture so adamantly, as well as
those bishops in Germany who would support their pope rather than
their king in this contest.
Historians have seen two further problems in the "Ottonian
System." First, as the Papacy was located in the Italian peninsula,
the German kings' concerns seemed to always drag them south, into conflict,
and away from focus on their German homeland. In the process,
they left the arena open for noble revolts, a common feature of
the period. Also, as they sometimes needed to delegate authority,
especially in urban areas, during the king's absences a secular
feudal nobility began to form. More importantly, a seemingly psychological
disability of German kings was their tendency to attempt to extend
sovereignty into Italy, as had Pepin and Charlemagne. In pursuit
of the Imperial ideal, they often overextended themselves, and
could not sustain control. It also brought them into conflict
with Byzantium, as well as the Normans. Furthermore, Italian towns
were totally unlike German ones, and were unlikely to submit to
German authority.
The other criticism of the German kings' methods is that
by avoiding feudal arrangements and the cultivation of a feudal
hierarchy of nobles in support of the king, German rulers prevented
the development of a political glue, or political technology, able
to hold together a monarchical state when reliance on the Church
was no longer an option. The argument is that while German kings
could have established themselves as feudal monarchs of a much
stronger sort than their French counterparts, their failure to
take advantage of a system deemed legitimate by German nobles stunted
political development, and would make German kings from the 1060s
to 1120s much weaker, after the post-Investiture
Controversy process of feudalization had taken place.
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