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Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologica: Proofs for the Existence of God
Summary
Question 1 of part 1 of the Summa considers
the nature and extent of “sacred doctrine,” or theology. Aquinas
concludes that, although theology does not require philosophy to
promote knowledge of God, philosophy nevertheless can be of service
to the aims of theology.
Question 2 of part 1 concerns the existence of God and
is subdivided into three Articles. In the First Article, Aquinas
maintains that the proposition “God exists” is self-evident in itself,
but not to us, and thus requires demonstration. The Second Article
concludes that such a demonstration is indeed possible, despite
objections to the contrary. The famous Third Article addresses the
question of whether God exists, and in this Article, Aquinas offers
his Five Ways as proofs for the existence of God.
First, we observe that some things in the world are in
motion. Whatever is in motion is put into motion by another object
that is in motion. This other object, in turn, was put into motion
by still another object preceding it, and so forth. This series
cannot go on backward to infinity, though, since there would otherwise
be no first mover and thus no subsequent movement. Therefore, we
must conclude that there is a first unmoved mover, which we understand
to be God.
Second, we observe that everything has an efficient cause
and that nothing is or can be the cause of itself. It is impossible,
though, that the series of causes should extend back to infinity
because every cause is dependent on a prior cause and the ultimate
cause is thus dependent on a previous cause. So if there is no first
cause, there will be no intermediate causes and no final cause.
But the absence of such causes clearly does not square with our
observation, and so there must therefore be a first efficient cause,
which everyone calls God.
Third, we observe in nature things that are possible to
be and not to be, as they come into existence and pass out of existence.
Such things could not always exist, though, because something that
could possibly not exist at some time actually does not exist at
some time. Thus, if it is possible for everything not to exist,
then, at some time, nothing did exist. But if nothing ever did exist,
then nothing would exist even now, since everything that exists
requires for its existence something that already existed. Yet it
is absurd to claim that nothing exists even now. Therefore, not
all beings are merely possible, but there must be something the
existence of which is necessary. Now, every necessary thing has
its necessity caused by something else or it does not. Since it
is impossible for there to exist an infinite series of causes of
necessary things, we must conclude that there is something that
is necessary in itself. People speak of this thing as God.
Fourth, beings in the world have characteristics to varying degrees.
Some are more or less good, true, noble, and so forth. Such gradations
are all measured in relation to a maximum, however. Thus, there
must be something best, truest, noblest, and so on. Now, as Aristotle
teaches, things that are greatest in truth are also greatest in
being. Therefore, there must be something that is the cause of being,
goodness, and every other perfection that we find in beings in the
world. We call this maximum cause God.
Finally, we observe in nature that inanimate and nonintelligent objects
act toward the best possible purpose, even though these objects
are not aware of doing so. It is clear that these objects do not achieve
their purpose by sheer chance but rather according to a plan. Any
inanimate or nonintelligent object that acts toward a purpose, though,
must be guided by a being that possesses knowledge and intelligence,
just as an arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, there must
be some intelligent being that directs all natural things toward
their purpose. We call this being God.
Having presented these proofs for the existence of God,
Aquinas goes on to discuss God in terms of his simplicity, perfection,
goodness, infinity, knowledge, and other attributes. This discussion
leads into a protracted consideration of questions pertaining to
the Creation, the nature of angels, demons, and the work done on
the individual six days of the Creation, which culminated with the
creation of man.
Analysis
The existence of God is the necessary foundation of any
theology. Before discussing any other topics, Aquinas needs to establish
the crucial fact that God exists, since, without certainty of God’s
existence, the conclusions of the rest of the Summa would
be in doubt or even in vain. To this end, he advances five arguments
intended to prove the existence of God. Arguments 1, 2, and 5 are
based on observation of the natural world, whereas Arguments 3 and
4 are based on rational speculation. In Arguments 1, 2, 4, and 5,
Aquinas concludes that only the existence of God can provide a sufficient explanation
for the questions raised. In Argument 3, he concludes that God must
necessarily exist for his own sake. Thus, Arguments 1, 2, 4, and
5 conclude that God exists because the world requires him as an
explanation, and Argument 3 concludes that God could not not exist.
Argument 1 considers and attempts to account for the presence of
change in the world. Aquinas draws his argument from Aristotelian
physics, which was known as “natural philosophy” in Aquinas’s day
and which studied motion and change in the physical world. Just
as everything that exists in the world is generated by something
before it, so too must motion be passed from one object to another.
Rigidly applying this principle, though, we find ourselves confronted
with an infinitely regressive series and thus with the need for
a first unmoved mover to set the entire series into motion. Aquinas
is saying that an infinitely regressive series is impossible, and
from the impossibility of such a series, he concludes that the first
unmoved mover can be only God.
Argument 2 marks a transition from argumentation based
on physics to argumentation based on metaphysics and considers the existence
of the world as a whole. In this argument, Aquinas relies on the
“principle of efficient causation,” a cardinal assumption of physics
which states that every effect must have a cause. Aquinas reasons
by analogy that, just as no object in the world comes into being
from nothing or by itself but every object is caused, so too must
the world as a whole come into being through a cause, namely, through
God.
Argument 3 carries the premise of Argument 2 into the
realm of metaphysics and rational speculation about being itself.
Aquinas first defines possible beings as those that can either exist
or not exist, thereby implying that necessary beings are those that
necessarily must, and thus do, exist. All objects in the world are
possible beings and thus can either exist or not exist. Aquinas
reasons that, since these objects can, in principle, either exist
or not exist at any time, then they did in fact not exist at some
time. Yet, Aquinas continues, if they did not exist at some time,
then we are at a loss to explain the obvious existence of the world
now, since all that exists requires a cause for its existence. Aquinas
concludes that there must be an absolutely necessary being, that
is, one that (1) must necessarily exist and (2) thus owes its existence
to no other being.
Argument 4 is unique among the five Arguments in that
it considers not the physical or metaphysical but the qualitative.
By a leap of abstraction, Aquinas, adopting Aristotle, concludes
that there must be something in relation to which all individual
qualities, such as good, true, beautiful, and noble, are measured
and from which those qualities derive their existence. For example,
the existence of something good implies the existence of something
best that not only serves as the ultimate benchmark against which
the good thing is measured but also even causes the good thing to
exist. The idea that ultimate qualities are responsible for the
existence of lesser instances of qualities is strongly reminiscent
of Plato’s idea that Forms (i.e., essences) are the real and true
originals of which lesser beings (i.e., existences) are pale and
inferior copies. Nevertheless, Aquinas, following Aristotle, invests
these ultimate qualities with beingin other words, with existence.
Argument 5 appeals to our wonder in the face of the apparent purposive
activity of the animate and inanimate worlds alike. The world, functioning
with such smoothness, efficiency, detail, and aim, simply cannot
be the product of chance but must be the product of a sort of grand
architect, that is, of God. Aquinas is drawing two rather bold conclusions
here: there is a designer and that the designer is God.
There are strong conceptual ties between and among the
first three Arguments. Arguments 1 and 2 are similar in that both
maintain that there cannot be a series of causes stretching back
infinitely. The two Arguments are different, though, in that Argument
1 considers the cause of motion in individual objects in the world, whereas
Argument 2 considers the cause of the entire world itself. Argument
1 takes the existence of the world for granted and seeks to account
for observable change in the physical world. Argument 2, on the
other hand, does draw on observation of the world but attempts to
account for the existence of the world. Argument 3 considers the
concept of being itself and casts its gaze toward theoretical, nonobservable
states of the world far beyond our possible experience. Thus, the
first three Arguments attempt to force one to accept the proposition
that only the existence of God can account for (1) change in the
physical world, (2) the existence of the physical world, and (3)
existence itself.
Having established that God exists, Aquinas is free to
consider God’s nature and works.
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