Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: Historical & Philosophical Context for Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Previous Next

We have seen in Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere that Kant is fond of asking people to give up things. Sometimes those things are beliefs, and sometimes those things are practices. Enlightenment rationalism (EM) is the broad intellectual movement that Kant is usually identified with, though Kant's work differs from the work of other representatives of this movement. Historians usually say that Enlightenment rationalism begins in the mid- to late-seventeenth century and ends in the early nineteenth century. Most representatives of this movement believed that human beings (a) deserve more freedom than they actually enjoy, (b) are bestowed with reason, an ability that tracks the good through trial and error, and (c) should therefore not be subject to monarchical, tyrannical political and social institutions.

Unfortunately, people describing the beliefs of Enlightenment philosophers often bundle these distinct claims under one single idea, namely that human reason is unqualifiedly good and by itself would destroy evil political institutions and wayward beliefs. This false summary is extremely misleading at best, because most Enlightenment philosophers had reservations about reason. They did not, as this summary suggests, believe that reason was an unqualified good. Let us take a closer look at how Kant himself interpreted the three distinct elements of Enlightenment thought.

Kant believes that human beings deserve to be as free as possible. And he believes that freedom comes in at least two flavors, both of which human beings have a right to enjoy. First, we should have the right to live without political or social institutions that rob people of freedoms. In cases where giving up freedom has a larger, justifiable purpose, Kant has no complaints. Justifiable purposes may include ensuring public safety, protecting personal property, and providing public subsidies for the less fortunate. But when governments rob people of liberty for reasons that are not justifiable to citizens themselves, then there is a problem. The idea that governments must answer to their citizens is both a foundational element of real democracy and the subject of a lot of interesting work in democratic theory.

Secondly, people must be free of coercive influences when making their own private choices. Political institutions, therefore, are not the only obstacles to freedom. Friends, relatives, spouses, and social institutions sometimes coerce us into doing things we would otherwise avoid. Of course, children sometimes need to be coerced, so that they can avoid getting into trouble, a point of which Kant is aware. But the situation for rational adults of sound mind is different. In Kant's view, reasonable adults can undoubtedly know what morality requires without relying on the coercive "wisdom" of a particular church. With this belief, Kant robs the church of its claim to fame, that is, the idea that the church has the last word on moral questions. Kant's general objective in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is to free individuals from religious traditions that interfere with the individuals' ability to adopt the right moral principles.

Let us move on to the second element of Enlightenment thought, which is the idea that all human beings are bestowed with reason, reason that helps us, through trial and error, figure out what is good. To a certain extent, Kant does believe that reason can help human beings analyze social and political problems of all sorts. He also believes, as most Enlightenment thinkers do, that reason can help organize society in accordance with what justice requires. However, Kant does not believe that unaided reason naturally gravitates to the good. In fact, the Critique of Pure Reason was written to reveal just how far off track reason naturally travels when left to its own devices. While reason can be a helpful tool, it must be properly controlled so that we do not unreflectively accept religious doctrines for which we have no evidence. That proper control comes from what Kant calls the critical method. Basically, the critical method is a philosophical approach that allows people to discover which questions reason can answer, and which ones it cannot. So, while Kant does believe that reason can help us supplant unjust political regimes with better ones, he does not believe that reason is an unqualified good. Rather, he believes, we must employ reason critically in order to avoid heading down the wrong path.

As for the third element of Enlightenment thought, Kant believes that human beings are not meant to live under tyrannical political regimes. Because these regimes curb our freedom, he says, they should be supplanted by democratic regimes which respect political liberties. But Kant has a deeper explanation of why human beings are actually more fit for democratic institutions than they are for other kinds of political regimes. He insists that the appeal of democratic institutions cannot simply be explained by the fact that we possess reason. In his view, as rational creatures we are destined to promote "the highest good as a good common to all" (6:97). Democratic political institutions appeal to us partly because they facilitate the pursuit of common goals. Unlike some other Enlightenment thinkers, Kant holds that democracy is not only humane, but also in keeping with the basic human desire to pursue collective ends.

The Enlightenment is a very complex movement, and it is large enough to allow for a wide range of views on its main tenets. It is important to remember that Kant is a critical representative of the Enlightenment. He regards reason as a tool that human beings have at their disposal, a tool they can choose to use wisely or poorly. In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant encourages us to use this powerful tool wisely, for doing so is the only way to commit ourselves firmly to an enlightened, moral religion.