Chapters XX–XXIII
Summary — Chapter XX: Whether Fortresses and Many
Other Expedients That Princes Commonly Employ Are Useful or Not
To defend against internal insurrection, princes
have used a variety of strategies. Some have divided towns, some
have disarmed the populace, some have tried to woo disloyal subjects,
and others have built or destroyed fortresses. The effectiveness
of each of these policies depends on the individual conditions,
but a few generalizations can be made.
Historically, new princes have never prevented their
subjects from having weapons. Arming subjects fosters loyalty among
the people and defends the prince. Disarming subjects will breed
distrust, which leads to civil animosity. But if a prince annexes
a state, he must disarm his new subjects. He can allow his supporters
in the new state to keep their arms, but eventually they must also
be made weaker. The best arrangement is to have the prince's own
soldiers occupying the new state. However, weakening an annexed
territory by encouraging factionalism only makes it more easily
captured by foreigners, as the Venetians learned.
Princes become great by defeating opposition. Thus, one
way they can enhance their stature is to cunningly foster opposition
that can be easily overcome. Moreover, fostering subversion in a
new state will help reveal the motives of potential conspirators.
Some princes have chosen to build fortresses to curb
rebellion. Others have destroyed them, in order to maintain control
in newly acquired states. The usefulness of fortresses depends on
the specific circumstances. But a fortress will not be able to protect
a prince if he is hated by his subjects. The issue is not whether
a prince should build a fortress. Rather, a prince should not put
all his trust in a fortress, neglecting the attitudes of his people.
Summary — Chapter XXI: What a Prince Must Do to Be
Esteemed
Great enterprises and noble examples are two ways for
a prince to earn prestige. Examples of great campaigns include those
of King Ferdinand of Spain, who skillfully used his military to
attack Granada, Africa, Italy, and France. These campaigns focused
his people's attention and prevented attacks against Ferdinand.
Nobility can be achieved by the grand public display
of rewards and punishments. Above all, princes should win a reputation
for being men of outstanding ability.
A prince can also win prestige by declaring himself an
ally of one side of a conflict. Neutrality alienates both the victor
and the loser. The victor sees the neutral prince as a doubtful
friend; the loser sees the neutral prince as weak coward. Someone
who is not your friend will always request that you remain neutral,
while a true friend will always ask you for your armed support.
A prince can escape short-term danger through neutrality, but at
the cost of long-term grief. Instead, a prince should boldly declare
support for one side.
If the prince allies with someone stronger than himself,
and this ally wins, then the prince protects himself through
the alliance, because the victor will feel an obligation to the
prince. If this stronger ally loses, at least the prince will win
the protection and shelter of the ally. If the prince is stronger
than either opponent, an alliance essentially means the destruction
of one side through the help of another.
If possible, a prince should avoid siding with an ally
whose power is greater than his own. Victory in this situation will
only put the prince at mercy of that ally. However, sometimes
such an alliance is unavoidable. Because of these instances, a prince
should never believe that a completely safe course exists. Instead,
he should assess the risks presented by all options and choose the
least risky course of action. A prudent prince can assess threats
and accept the lesser evil.
A prince should encourage his citizens to excel in their
occupations, and live their lives in peace. Thus, a prince should
never discourage or excessively tax private acquisition
or prosperous commerce. Instead, a prince should reward those who
contribute to the overall prosperity of the state. Such rewards
might include annual city-wide festivals and personal visits with
guilds and -family groups.
Summary — Chapter XXII: Concerning the Prince's Ministers
The selection of ministers is a critical task because
ministers give visitors their first impression of the prince. Wise
and loyal ministers contribute to the image of a wise prince. Inversely,
incompetent and disloyal ministers give the prince the image of
incompetence.
There are three types of intellect that men can possess:
the ability to understand things independently, the ability to appreciate another
person's ability to understand things, and the ability to do neither.
The first kind is best, the second acceptable, and the third useless.
If a prince possesses at least the second kind of intellect, he can
judge whether his ministers' actions are good or bad.
If a minister thinks more of himself than of the prince
and does everything for personal profit, then he is a bad minister.
A prince should recognize this state of affairs. Good ministers,
however, should be rewarded to maintain their loyalty. Rewards can
be paid in money, honor, and expanded responsibilities. It is crucial
for a prince to have a confident relationship with his ministers.
Summary — Chapter XXIII: How to Avoid Flatterers
Flatterers present a danger to any ruler because it is
natural for -powerful men to become self-absorbed. The best way
to defend against such people is to convince them that you are not
offended by the truth. But if everyone can speak to the prince,
the prince will lose respect. A prince should allow only wise advisers
to speak with him, and only when he specifically requests their
advice. A prince should not listen to anyone else and should be
firm in his decisions. Vacillation will lead to a loss of respect.
A prince must always seek advice. But he must seek it
only when he wants it, not when others thrust it upon him. Most
important, a prince must always be skeptical about the advice he
receives, constantly questioning and probing. If he ever discovers
that someone is concealing the truth from him, he must punish that
person severely. In the end, no matter how intelligent a prince's
advisers might be, a prince is doomed if he lacks intelligence of
his own. Wise princes should be honored for good actions proceeding
from good advice.
Analysis — Chapters XX–XXIII
Chapter XX returns to the issue of popular insurrection
and how a prince should defend against it. Machiavelli argues that
a prince must avoid hatred and suppress opposition before it can
gain sufficient momentum to disrupt his rule. Also, he does not
base his assessment of fortresses on their military value. Fortresses
can be worthwhile or worthless depending on the individual circumstances.
The attitude of the people outweighs the value of any physical structure.
Machiavelli places emphasis on a distinctly nonmilitary aspect in
his discussion of fortresses, a building traditionally associated
with the military, indicating his broad interpretation of warcraft.
Chapters XXI and XXII underscore the importance of appearing honorable
and wise. This goal can be achieved partly through the selection
of a loyal and competent personal staff. Machiavelli distinguishes
between a virtuous appearance and an honorable, wise appearance.
Appearing virtuous—generous, benevolent, and pious—is desirable
but not necessary. However, appearing honorable and sagacious is
crucial. Machiavelli's preference for some good qualities over others—for
example, courage and decisiveness over generosity—is grounded in
a practical argument. Generosity is undesirable because it wastes
capital resources; decisiveness is desirable because it breeds respect
among allies and subjects.
Chapter XXIII states that, ultimately, a prince must
possess independent intellect in order to succeed. He cannot simply
rely on the wisdom of his advisers. In a way, this idea supports
Machiavelli's allusion to the possibility that a common man can
become a prince through the study of warcraft and through practical
experience. Machiavelli's view of politics is more meritocratic
than aristocratic, as he suggests that hereditary princes have even
more to prove than those who obtain power through intelligence and
skill.
