payment page
Was the Cold War inevitable?
The Cold War was likely inevitable. The alliance that had formed between the United States and the USSR during World War II was not strong enough to overcome the past decades of suspicion and unease between the two nations. Moreover, as both Truman and Stalin sought to achieve their postwar security objectives, which were often mutually exclusive, neither was willing to compromise.
What were the root causes of US-Soviet tensions?
Even though they were allies against Germany and (to a lesser degree) Japan during World War II, the United States and the USSR had always generally disliked and distrusted each other. Americans had hated and feared Communism ever since it had appeared in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and had refused to recognize the new Soviet government, especially after Bolshevik leaders promoted the destruction of capitalism. During World War II, Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill delayed their decision to open a second front, which would have distracted the Nazis and taken pressure off the Red Army entrenched at Stalingrad. Stalin resented this delay, just as he resented the fact that the United States and Great Britain refused to share their atomic weapons research with the Soviet Union. After the war, Truman’s decision to give Great Britain relief loans while denying similar requests from the USSR only added to the resentment.
How did World War II’s aftermath set up the US and USSR to be natural adversaries?
A major factor contributing to the Cold War was the fact that the United States and USSR were the only two powers to escape World War II relatively unharmed. Whereas other major world powers such as Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany lay in ruins, the Soviet Union and the United States still had manufacturing and military capabilities. The world had been a multipolar one before the war but was bipolar afterward, and this new order implicitly pitted the already distrustful and ideologically opposed United States and Soviet Union against each other.
How did the US and USSR fundamentally differ over the future of Europe in 1945?
At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union had fundamentally conflicting security goals that neither side would concede. The USSR, which had already been invaded twice in the first half of the 20th century, wanted to set up friendly (puppet) governments throughout Eastern Europe to create a buffer between Moscow and Germany. In addition to exacting enormous war reparations, Stalin wanted to dismantle German factories to keep Germany weak and dependent. Conversely, Truman—mindful of how the terms of the Treaty of Paris had backfired—believed that rebuilding, reindustrializing, and democratizing Europe was the key to preventing another world war. With neither side willing to compromise on their conflicting postwar plans, as well as their core ideologies and postwar plans, tension between the United States and the USSR was inevitable.
In what ways was the Korean War significant Cold War event?
The Korean War both began and ended with the Korean Peninsula divided at the 38th parallel. Despite it being a stalemate a status quo ante bellum (the way things were before the war) outcome, it was significant for many reasons, including the high number of casualties resulting from it. Both sides of the 38th suffered terribly—with over 400,000 South Koreans and more than 250,000 North Koreans killed, along with their allies (another 60,000 Americans, Chinese, and others killed). Beyond that, the Korean War helped define the Cold War, established a precedent for keeping peripheral wars limited rather than direct encounters between the US and USSR, and boosted defense spending in the United States.
How did the Korean War impact the United States and its future conduct?
The Korean War was a bellwether event in terms US policy. It set the tone for US conflicts throughout the Cold War (by having peripheral wars be limited) as would be seen most significantly in the Vietnam War. In expanding the draft and sending more than 3 million U.S. troops to Korea (of which nearly 40,000 would die), Truman demonstrated the US commitment to containing Communism at almost any cost to the Soviets and China.
The war also boosted US military spending, because of a recommendation issued by the National Security Council, known as NSC-68. The memo suggested that Congress quadruple military and defense spending to contain the Soviet Union. As a result, Congress’s annual defense spending soared in the following years, hovering at roughly 50 percent of the total budget under the Eisenhower administration. Government investment in defense factories kept employment high and money flowing into the economy between 1950 and 1970, contributing significantly to the prosperous economic boom. However, the fact that defense spending was so high naturally left less money for other types of governmental spending.
How did the Korean War end up being a tactical stalemate?
Although General Douglas MacArthur captured nearly the entire Korean Peninsula after his brilliant Inchon landing, his tactical miscalculation at the Yalu River brought China into the war and forced United Nations troops back down to the 38th parallel, where they had started. Both sides became entrenched there, each preventing the other from making any headway. As a result, neither side could claim victory when ceasefire negotiations began in 1953. In the 70 years plus since, the 38th parallel has remained one of the “hottest” Cold War borders in the world, almost as if the war had never really ended.
Why didn’t Truman use nuclear weapons in Korea?
Truman’s rationale for using atomic bombs in Japan in 1945 was that it would save the lives of US soldiers who would have died in an invasion of the Japanese mainland. He employed different reasoning in Korean, however, where he set the precedent of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. He did so even though MacArthur advocated using them against North Koreans and the Chinese. Although the American public criticized Truman for the decision to not use nuclear weapons and for firing his insubordinate general, the decision proved to be prudent. Truman knew that using nuclear weapons would drag the Soviet Union and China fully into the conflict, which would destabilize Europe and initiate a third world war—one that might even lead to all-out nuclear war.
By refusing to use nuclear weapons, Truman kept the war confined to the Korean Peninsula. The decision would later have an enormous impact on future presidents making similar decisions in Vietnam. Truman’s actions in Korea therefore demonstrated not only American resolve to contain Communism but also a desire to keep the Cold War from devolving into a much wider open war.
