Even as late as 1827, antislavery societies in the south
outnumbered those in the north. Virginia had even considered a
gradual emancipation plan in 1830s, though it was ultimately rejected.
But as the nineteenth century progressed, such liberal sentiment
began to ebb, with slavery becoming an increasingly integral part
of the southern economy. In the presence of a constantly industrializing
North, the South began to focus its resources more and more on
agricultural staple crops, and especially on cotton. The intensive
labor required of such an effort led to exponential growth in the
slave population. By the brink of the Civil War, southern whites
numbered 5.5 million, while the slave population was estimated
at 3.5 million.
While slavery was integral to the southern fortunes, it
was not pervasive among the broader society. Only about five percent
of southern whites were actually slaveholders, and a sizeable proportion
of southern slaves was held by the 38,000 who owned twenty slaves
or more. Nevertheless, with a mounting tide of abolitionism and
anti-southern sentiment against it, the newly-organized Confederates
were able to win considerable support from many poor whites who
had perhaps less of a stake in the slavery question, but were equally
affected by Union control of tariff rates and general issues of
state sovereignty.
For his part, as a candidate Lincoln had repeatedly stressed
a policy of containing slavery without eliminating it. In the
early days of the war, Lincoln had even gone so far as to revoke
several hasty emancipation proclamations made by zealous Union
generals. This, however, was more with an eye to politics than
to the integrity of property. Lincoln's persistent personal wish
was to gradually and completely eliminate the institution of slavery,
and as the war dragged on, steps toward such action began to emerge
as real possibilities.
Lincoln had first proposed gradual, compensated emancipation of
slaves in the border states in spring of 1862. But wary of losing support
in these key locations, his cabinet demurred, and Lincoln elected
to focus his slavery strategy in more decided Union strongholds.
Using his executive influence, Lincoln helped to push through
the abolishment of slavery in the District of Columbia on April
16. Three months later slavery was abolished in United States territories,
nullifying popular sovereignty and overriding the Dred Scott decision.
While such instances appear to the contemporary eye as
policies driven by moral principles, they were in fact, far less
idealistically, strategic aims to practical war ends. By rallying
Union support around the cause of abolition, Lincoln hoped to spur
on flagging confidence in a demoralized and severely weakened military
force. Thus, in midsummer, Lincoln cautiously floated a draft
of the Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. With rumors swirling
around Washington, Lincoln steadfastly asserted his position to New
York newspaperman and politician Horace Greeley in late August.
As Lincoln wrote, "my paramount object in this struggle is to
save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy
slavery." If possible, he explained, he would "save the Union
without freeing any slave." However, Lincoln
insisted that his political strategy be disassociated from his personal
views, writing that he "intend[ed] no modification of my oft-expressed personal
wish that all men everywhere could be free."
While his idealistic wish to separate his personal motives
from his professional decisions may have been realized in some
degree, it is certain that Lincoln's individual views came increasingly
to encroach upon his policy decisions as the strain of war grew
heavier. Gradually, the distinction between the preservation of
Union and the destruction of slavery began to blur in Lincoln's
mind, as he recognized the latter as an potentially effective means
of accomplishing the former.
