Even as late as 1827, antislavery societies in the south
outnumbered those in the north. Virginia had even considered a
gradual emancipation plan in 1830s, though it was ultimately rejected.
But as the nineteenth century progressed, such liberal sentiment
began to ebb, with slavery becoming an increasingly integral part
of the southern economy. In the presence of a constantly industrializing
North, the South began to focus its resources more and more on
agricultural staple crops, and especially on cotton. The intensive
labor required of such an effort led to exponential growth in the
slave population. By the brink of the Civil War, southern whites
numbered 5.5 million, while the slave population was estimated
at 3.5 million.
While slavery was integral to the southern fortunes, it
was not pervasive among the broader society. Only about five percent
of southern whites were actually slaveholders, and a sizeable proportion
of southern slaves was held by the 38,000 who owned twenty slaves
or more. Nevertheless, with a mounting tide of abolitionism and
anti-southern sentiment against it, the newly-organized Confederates
were able to win considerable support from many poor whites who
had perhaps less of a stake in the slavery question, but were equally
affected by Union control of tariff rates and general issues of
state sovereignty.
For his part, as a candidate Lincoln had repeatedly stressed
a policy of containing slavery without eliminating it. In the
early days of the war, Lincoln had even gone so far as to revoke
several hasty emancipation proclamations made by zealous Union
generals. This, however, was more with an eye to politics than
to the integrity of property. Lincoln's persistent personal wish
was to gradually and completely eliminate the institution of slavery,
and as the war dragged on, steps toward such action began to emerge
as real possibilities.
Lincoln had first proposed gradual, compensated emancipation of
slaves in the border states in spring of 1862. But wary of losing support
in these key locations, his cabinet demurred, and Lincoln elected
to focus his slavery strategy in more decided Union strongholds.
Using his executive influence, Lincoln helped to push through
the abolishment of slavery in the District of Columbia on April
16. Three months later slavery was abolished in United States territories,
nullifying popular sovereignty and overriding the Dred Scott decision.
While such instances appear to the contemporary eye as
policies driven by moral principles, they were in fact, far less
idealistically, strategic aims to practical war ends. By rallying
Union support around the cause of abolition, Lincoln hoped to spur
on flagging confidence in a demoralized and severely weakened military
force. Thus, in midsummer, Lincoln cautiously floated a draft
of the Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. With rumors swirling
around Washington, Lincoln steadfastly asserted his position to New
York newspaperman and politician Horace Greeley in late August.
As Lincoln wrote, "my paramount object in this struggle is to
save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy
slavery." If possible, he explained, he would "save the Union
without freeing any slave." However, Lincoln
insisted that his political strategy be disassociated from his personal
views, writing that he "intend[ed] no modification of my oft-expressed personal
wish that all men everywhere could be free."
While his idealistic wish to separate his personal motives
from his professional decisions may have been realized in some
degree, it is certain that Lincoln's individual views came increasingly
to encroach upon his policy decisions as the strain of war grew
heavier. Gradually, the distinction between the preservation of
Union and the destruction of slavery began to blur in Lincoln's
mind, as he recognized the latter as an potentially effective means
of accomplishing the former.
As Lincoln would later explain, "the moment came when
I felt that slavery must die that the nation might live." With
the moral weight of a righteous cause behind the Union, the threat
of foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy would dwindle
to insignificance, and better still, Northerners of all stripes
would begin to throw additional support behind a war with a more
concrete purpose.
On the advice of Seward, Lincoln decided to wait for a
major Union military victory before releasing a preliminary version
of the Emancipation Proclamation, in order to give it a more substantial cast.
But the Battle of Antietam was as close as the Union would come
to a "victory" in the late summer of 1862, and on the strength of
this mixed result, Lincoln issued the preliminary version to Congress
anyway on September 22.
The final draft, which was officially released and put
into effect on January 1, 1863, provided for the emancipation of
all slaves in rebel territory. Such a decree was, by any honest
analysis, patently impracticable, as the Union forces were lagging
severely, and powerless to enforce such legislation. Further, the
proclamation did not apply to border states (where insurgents had
lost the right to hold slaves, while loyalists retained the right!),
or even to the Union-held western portions of the Confederacy.
Thus, in paradoxical fashion, but nevertheless to his
eventual success, Lincoln refused to act in the areas where he
had jurisdiction, and made a sweeping pronouncement that applied
to an area where he had no authority at all! Ultimately, it was
only the power of war that would see the Proclamation through.
But in early 1863, such power was by no means conclusive. On the
very day that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, a bloody,
wasteful battle was fought at Mumfreesboro, Tennessee. After 20,000
casualties, no clear winner emerged. With the tactics of the two
sides as confused as ever, Lincoln's strong words were somewhat
undermined by yet another failure in the field.
In addition to being potentially unfeasible, the Emancipation Proclamation
was of doubtful legality, standing as a striking extension of the
president's war powers. Lincoln himself was unsure of its legality,
and privately wondered if it would function simply as a war measure
to be repealed later. Opposition to the policy was certainly strong.
Several regiments in Illinois and Indiana came close to mutiny.
Many of Lincoln's contemporaries criticized him heavily for his
presumption and usurpation of power.
Radical abolitionists, on the other hand, chose to decry
him for his refusal to initiate a more concerted emancipation policy
in the border states. In the event, Lincoln had merely opted for
a plan by which a state referendum in support of repeal would be
rewarded by federal compensation. None of the border states took
the bait.
Although Lincoln is viewed today as "the Great Emancipator,"
it is a title he wears uncomfortably in view of the relevant facts.
His Emancipation Proclamation ultimately freed a miniscule proportion
of slaves, and federal legislation beyond this decree did not go into
effect until after Lincoln's death. While he was instrumental
in paving the way for the abolition of slavery, Lincoln's role
as an emancipator was not without ambiguity or reservation.
Against the better advice of many Union strategists and
Congress themselves, Lincoln vetoed the use of black soldiers in
the field in 1862. In fact, he did not authorize blacks to serve
as soldiers in Union army until after the Emancipation Proclamation
was issued. Even then, blacks fought strictly in separate regiments
with white commanding officers. But to be fair, despite lower
numbers and a more desperate position, the Confederacy did not authorize
blacks for combat until March of 1865, mere weeks before their
surrender.
As for Lincoln, his hesitancy over the armament of blacks
was closely related to his doubts over their capacity to integrate
fully into the political and social life of the United States.
Thus, for much of his Presidency, Lincoln remained a strong supporter
of the controversial colonization policy. Originally proposed
by Henry Clay, colonization was a plan for the federal government
to finance the return of freed slaves to majority black areas such
as Haiti and Liberia. For all intents and purposes, the scheme
was tantamount to subsidized deportation, and today it smacks of
blatant racism.
Though the contemporary reader may be inclined to dismiss
Lincoln as a hypocritical bigot, one must remember that even the
greatest men are the products of their times. Lincoln's logic
in supporting colonization was grounded in the fundamental reality of
racial discord, which persists strongly even today. As he explained
to an audience of freed blacks in August 1862, "your race suffers
greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffers from
your presence. In a word, we suffer on each side...if this is admitted,
it affords a reason, at least, why we should be separated."
Over time, Lincoln began to have second thoughts about
colonization. Perhaps convinced by his own rhetoric in the swell
of events, he eventually revised his position. In the spring of
1864, Lincoln ordered Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to return
those black colonists removed to the Caribbean who would prefer
to be back in the United States. Later, Lincoln would run for re-
election on the platform of a universal emancipation amendment,
but while he would live to see it through Congress, the Thirteenth
Amendment was ratified in his memory and not by his signature.
Nevertheless, and with substantial justification, this final emancipation
is today viewed as a cornerstone of the Lincoln legacy.
