In October 16, 1945, Oppenheimer resigned from his position
as director of Los Alamos, intending to return to academic life.
Within two years, he was appointed to the directorship of Princeton
University's Institute for Advanced Study, the world-renowned center of
thought whose best known scholar in resident was Albert Einstein.
But academia proved too tame for Oppenheimer. His years
at Los Alamos had given him a taste for power, fame, and the shaping of
public policy, and he wasn't yet ready to turn his back on public life.
Oppenheimer had never succeeded in making a name for himself as
a physicist, but he'd had phenomenal success as an administrator
and public figure–the government welcomed him back into service
with open arms.
Oppenheimer had become an international symbol for the
success of American physics, and his popularity and experience
easily translated into prestige and influence in Washington, D.C.
The creation of the atomic bomb represented an amazing achievement
for the United States, but now the United States, specifically
the United States government, needed to figure out what to do with
it. Oppenheimer was ready and willing to put in his two cents.
Shortly after Hiroshima, Oppenheimer testified in support
of the May-Johnson bill, which turned the Manhattan Project into
a permanent program and gave permanent control of the project over
to the military. Oppenheimer supported the bill in the hopes that
it represented a move toward some form of international control
over nuclear power. However, many of his colleagues were appalled
that any scientist would support putting science into the hands
of the government. They questioned whether the taste of political
power had corrupted his scientific integrity.
Undaunted by criticism, Oppenheimer continued in his attempt to
place the nuclear arsenal under international control. In 1946, Oppenheimer
helped to author a plan that would be presented to the United Nations
Atomic Energy Committee. Known as the Baruch Plan, the program
would establish a world authority, to be administered by the UN,
that would control all atomic energy research and development.
The Soviet Union would open its labs to international inspection,
and the United States would turn its bombs into power plants. When
Bernard Baruch, Truman's designated representative, presented the
idea to the UN, he insisted that under his plan, no nation could
have veto power. Insistent on not compromising their veto power,
the Soviet Union immediately rejected the Baruch Plan. It's likely
that the Soviets would have rejected the plan no matter what, as
it did not fit into their nuclear strategy–to either eliminate
the United States' nuclear arsenal, or to develop their own nuclear
weapons as soon as possible. The United States and the Soviet Union
were deadlocked, and negotiations soon fell apart.
Oppenheimer never lost sight of his goal, however, which
was to establish some form of peaceful, international control over
nuclear weaponry or, barring that, to ensure that the United States
government acted responsibly when it came to the American nuclear
arsenal. Contrary to what some later believed, Oppenheimer was
not against nuclear weapons. In fact, he agreed with the majority
of the country that nuclear weapons were essential to protecting
the nation's security. However, Oppenheimer would always feel partly responsible
for introducing nuclear weapons into the world and felt it was
his responsibility to monitor and attempt to influence how they
were used.
