Summary
In January of 1951, the PRC began making offers of peace. The outreach was
limited, China asked for a 7-power conference to be held on the issues of the
fate of Korea and Formosa's, as well as on the question of a Chinese UN
seat. The Americans, who considered the Chinese nationalists on Formosa to be
the rightful government of China, did not want to give China a seat in the
UN; the US rejected the PRC's offer for peace. Instead, at
Truman's prompting, the UN censured the PRC
for aggression.
On his own, MacArthur decided to go even further in antagonizing the
Chinese. In March, without consulting Washington, he decided to send an
ultimatum to the PRC. MacArthur demanded that the Chinese withdraw their
troops. If they didn't, he promised to force China to its knees. Truman was
incensed at MacArthur's rogue attempt to define and influence US policy; he
decided MacArthur had to be fired. Truman did not act immediately, however, and
as he waited, in early April of 1951, Congress approved
NATO, a sign that Truman's Europe-first policy had
been accepted. By this time the incident of the ultimatum had become worn-out,
and Truman needed another reason to fire MacArthur.
Within a few months, MacArthur leaked news to a congressman that he planned to
use Chinese Nationalist forces from Formosa in the Korean War. Such an act,
of course, would only serve to further enflame the PRC, and it again went
against Truman's diplomatic policies. After the congressman, Jospeh W. Martin,
read MacArthur's message before Congress, Truman began talking about dismissing
MacArthur with the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff). Meanwhile, in Operation
Rugged, General Matthew Ridgway was busy entrenching the Eighth Army in
favorable terrain about 20 miles north of the 38th
Parallel. Ridgway was preparing to hold off
another PRC offensive, which many American military leaders suspected was
imminent. The JCS was increasingly afraid that MacArthur's tactless reaction to
such an offensive might allow the situation to grow into a major conflict,
perhaps a World War III. Making sure of support within the JCS, which
unanimously supported MacArthur's dismissal, Truman fired MacArthur on April 11,
1951.
Truman made every effort to dismiss MacArthur in a polite and political way.
However, transmission of the message was botched, and MacArthur probably
received the news secondhand before hearing direct from the President.
Republicans and American fans of MacArthur were very upset by their hero's
dismissal; Republicans nearly brought impeachment hearings against Truman, but
were prevented because the JCS stood unanimously behind his decision.
Nonetheless, MacArthur was welcomed home as a hero, with massive parades. From
May 3 to January 25, 1951, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened to
look into the circumstances surrounding MacArthur's firing. Ultimately, the
committee found that MacArthur's dismissal was justified.
By early 1951, Truman really wanted to end the Korean War, of which Americans
were becoming more and more weary. MacArthur's unilateral decision to threaten
the PRC angered Truman because it only made the Chinese more resolved to stay in
the war. MacArthur, acting without consulting Washington first, was becoming
more and more undependable, although his assumption that
Stalin and the USSR would stay out of fighting
with the US ended up being correct. It is hard to say why MacArthur acted so
haphazardly, although it might be the case that since he knew he was
nearing the end of his career, he wanted to make himself into a martyr. Some
may argue that he was deliberately trying to be dismissed so that he would
become a Republican hero who could then run for President. Regardless,
MacArthur went against his President's orders, given in person at Wake
Island, to use tact and caution. Oddly, MacArthur decided to violate his
constitutional duty to serve his commander-in-chief in order to protect
his country, a country whose politics is largely based on the sanctity of that
constitution.
Building an anti-MacArthur coalition with the JCS was a crucial move for Truman.
MacArthur, hero of the Republican Party and wildly popular with the American
public, could not be fired on a whim. Truman's consultation with the JCS proved
to be extremely wise, for after MacArthur's dismissal, many Republican
congressmen began to suggest removing Truman through impeachment. Fortunately
for Truman, his support within the JCS, the American military's most senior
group, saved him from impeachment. While personally wise, Truman's actions also
had political effects. In standing beside Truman and perhaps saving him from
impeachment, the JCS gained a political power it had not previously held. In
following decades, Presidents would seek the advice of the JCS on military
decisions to protect themselves from political fallout should the operation go
badly.
