VII. Maneuvering

In this essay, Sun Tzu describes the inherent challenges of outmaneuvering one’s enemy. One must turn the “devious into the direct” (deceptive movement or plans into direct tactics). He warns against the cost of force-marching an army.  Provisions will have to be abandoned, the soldiers who survive will become disgruntled, and many soldiers will be killed or captured. This is similar to the previous essay regarding how circumstances should inform decisions regarding maneuvers.

The second half of this essay is concerned with unifying one’s army through the transmission of information. Drums, gongs, signal fires and flags are used to send specific messages, since words cannot carry effectively over large distances. Sun Tzu also stresses the importance of understanding the “spirit” of one’s soldiers. On a typical day, they are eager and willing in the morning, tired by midday, and only thinking of returning to camp by evening. One should use their eager soldiers to attack when the enemy is tired. The essay closes with warnings against specific maneuvers, such as not engaging an enemy that is returning home, always allowing an escape when surrounding an enemy, and not intercepting the enemy when their “banners are in perfect order.” This reiterates the necessity to understand an army’s “spirit,” both one’s own army and the enemy, and that it is easier to attain victory through an enemy surrender than annihilation.

VIII. Variation Of Tactics

In this essay, Sun Tzu starts with a list of statements that suggest a leader’s plans should be adaptable: “There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.” This also incorporates ideas from the previous essay, that a leader should be stoic and make decisions that are best for the war.

In the second half of this essay, Sun Tzu further focuses on a leader’s mindfulness with five dangerous faults that are “ruinous to the conduct of war.” The first, “Recklessness, which leads to destruction” cautions leaders to be reserved. The second, “Cowardice, which leads to capture” warns against fleeing from a battle and losing one’s army. The third, “A hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults” refers to the first essay, which instructs an effective leader to provoke one’s enemies. The fourth, “A delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame” encourages leaders to keep their pride in check when making decisions. The fifth, “Over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble” warns against feeling too concerned for one’s soldiers. The essay closes with a statement that when an army loses and the leader is killed, “the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults.”

Read about Main Idea #2: A successful leader will have thorough knowledge of oneself and one’s enemy.

IX. The Army on the March

In this essay, Sun Tzu starts by describing specific tactics for fighting on mountains, near rivers, on salt marshes, and flat ground. He states that the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi, a mythical Chinese hero) used these same tactics to achieve victory. Sun Tzu goes on to describe various geographic and atmospheric conditions, and the best ways to handle each. There are many thoughtful recommendations, such as preferring dry ground for camp to avoid disease (avoiding swamps and standing water). In the second half of the essay, he discusses a series of signs that can give insight into the enemy’s plans or movements (e.g. the movement of dust clouds can signify the type of troop movement, or the demeanor of the enemy’s commanders will signify advance or retreat). The essay closes with advice for handling soldiers. They should not be punished before having “grown attached to you” or they will not be obedient. Sun Tzu suggests consistency and insistence on one’s orders being obeyed, so that there are mutual gains for the leader and the soldiers.

X. Terrain

In this essay, Sun Tzu starts by identifying six kinds of terrain related to Earth: accessible ground, entangling ground, temporizing ground, narrow passes, precipitous heights, and positions at a great distance from the enemy. Accessible ground is easily traversed by either army. Sun Tzu advises to acquire the elevated and sunny spots before the enemy and protect one’s supply lines. Entangling ground is difficult to traverse but not impossible. Sun Tzu advises decisive action. Temporizing ground is that which offers no benefit to acting first. Sun Tzu reiterates previous tactical instructions (Essay IV). Narrow passes should be occupied first and fortified. If one cannot, they should not be attacked. Similarly, precipitous heights should be fortified and defended, but not attacked if the enemy has already occupied them. Sun Tzu advises against trying to engage over great distances.

Read an explanation of a key quote (#3) about the necessity of knowing one’s enemy and knowing one’s self.

Sun Tzu then explains the six “calamities” that a leader is responsible for: flight, insubordination, collapse, ruin, disorganization, and rout. Flight often happens when an army is forced to fight against a significantly larger army. Insubordination arises when the strength of the officers does not match that of the soldiers. Collapse is the result of the officers being much stronger than the soldiers. Ruin results when higher-ranking officers make decisions “from a feeling of resentment” (without conferring with the leader). Disorganization can happen in many levels from the top down (if the leader is weak, if orders are not clear, if duties are not assigned to officers, or if the ranks of soldiers are poorly organized). When a leader does a poor job at planning and tactics, the army will be routed.

The essay closes with discussion of the leader (or general) specifically. One must ignore the ruler/sovereign if victory or defeat are assured, and the ruler’s orders are against such outcomes. The leader should regard the army as his children, being careful not to spoil them. Sun Tzu reiterates earlier lessons about the leader knowing one’s own army when making tactical decisions.