Hegel agrees with other idealists, such as Kant, that consciousness of an object necessarily implies consciousness of a subject, which is a self-perceiving the object. In other words, human beings are not only conscious of objects but also self-conscious. Hegel takes this view a step further to suggest that self-consciousness involves not only a subject and an object but other subjects as well. Individuals become aware of selves through the eyes of another. Thus, true self-consciousness is a social process and involves a moment of radical identification with another consciousness, a taking on of another’s view of the world to obtain a self-image. Consciousness of self is always consciousness of the other.

In relationships of inequality and dependence, the subordinate partner, the bondsman, is always conscious of his subordinate status in the eyes of the other, while the independent partner, the lord, enjoys the freedom of negating consciousness of the subordinate other who is unessential to him. However, in doing so, the lord is uneasy because he has negated a consciousness with which he has radically identified to assure himself of his independent and free status. In short, he feels guilty for denying the moment of mutual identification and sameness to preserve his sense of independence and superiority. Social life is founded on this dynamic of competing moments of mutual identification and objectification, of identifying with and distancing oneself from the other.

Popular pages: Selected Works of G.W.F. Hegel