Summary
Hume stresses that his theory of morals follows naturally
from the philosophy he elaborates in the first two books. Hume attempts
to distinguish between vice and virtue, arguing that such moral
distinctions are in fact impressions rather than ideas. He then
describes how to distinguish these impressions from other common
impressions, such as sounds and colors. First, the impression of
vice is pain, while that of virtue is pleasure. Second, moral impressions
are caused only by human actions, not the actions of animals or
inanimate objects. Third, moral impressions are worth considering
only from a social point of view because our actions are considered
moral or immoral only with regard to how they affect others, not
how they affect ourselves. This concept leads Hume to classify sympathy,
feeling for fellow human beings, as the foundation of moral obligation.
For Hume, morality is not a matter of fact derived from
experience. To prove his point, he suggests we examine ourselves
with regard to any supposed moral misdeed, such as murder. If we
examine the act of murder, we can discover no idea of that quality
of immorality, or “vice.” Rather, we will discover only the strong
feeling of dislike we have for murder. This supports the idea that
morality resides in passions, or “sentiment,” not in reason. Although reason
does help us explain those feelings, it is not their origin.
Analysis
Hume makes the point that though we may not like it when
one person kills another, there is nothing contradictory or illogical
about the act of murder. This does not mean that Hume condones murder, merely
that immoral actions are not immoral because they are irrational.
Within Hume’s system, murder would be banned on the grounds that
it is not an action that can be universally justified as good for
everyone. Hume also proposes the example of the man who would rather
see the whole world destroyed rather than injure his own fingers.
Hume claims this man is not in contradiction to himself or following
illogical inferences, but this man also falls afoul of Hume’s dictum
that methods of justification and rationality must be universal.
Other people in the same situation must be able to justify their
actions in the same way. No one but the man will approve of his
reasons for forsaking the world to save his own fingers. It is unlikely
that this man would approve or desire that another person make the
same decision.
Hume ascribes moral decisions to the passions for several
reasons. First, passion appears to be the only viable alternative
to reason, which he has already ruled out. Second, Hume’s examination of
his own feelings about conventionally transgressive acts such as murder
reveals that while he can isolate his own feelings about such behavior,
he cannot isolate clear and distinct ideas about it. Therefore,
moral decisions must arise from or in some way be congruent with
passions. Hume’s connection of moral decisions to feelings, which
leads him to the separation of morality from reason, put him at
odds with religious leaders and philosophers of his time. Hume effectively
dethroned reason, removed God from a place of necessity, and robbed
religious theorists of an undisputed foundation for religious belief.