Summary
The subject of the Enquiry is the contributions
that moral sense and reason make in our moral judgments. Hume claims
that moral sense makes the ultimate distinction between vice and
virtue, though both moral sense and reason play a role in our formation
of moral judgments. Reason is important when we have to make a judgment about
what is useful, for reason alone can determine how and why something
is useful to us or to others. Hume briefly addresses what moral
judges usually include in their lists of virtues, what they leave out,
and how they make these lists. He then returns to the classification
of virtues he proposed first in the Treatise.
Hume first distinguishes between artificial and natural
virtues. Artificial virtues depend on social structures and include
justice and fidelity to promises; allegiance; chastity and modesty;
and duties of sovereign states to keep treaties, to respect boundaries,
to protect ambassadors, and to otherwise subject themselves to the
law of nations. Hume defines each of these virtues and explains
how each manifests itself in the world. He notes that artificial
virtues vary from society to society.
Natural virtues, on the other hand, originate in nature
and are more universal. They include compassion, generosity, gratitude, friendship,
fidelity, charity, beneficence, clemency, equity, prudence, temperance,
frugality, industry, courage, ambition, pride, modesty, self-assertiveness,
good sense, wit and humor, perseverance, patience, parental devotion,
good nature, cleanliness, articulateness, sensitivity to poetry,
decorum, and an elusive quality that makes a person lovely or valuable.
Some of these virtues are voluntary, such as pride, while others
are involuntary, such as good sense.
As in the Treatise, Hume explains that
reason does not cause our actions. Instead, moral sentiments, or
passions, motivate us to act. In the Enquiry, however,
Hume goes further to state that our actions are caused by a combination
of utility and sentiment. In other words, we must care about the
outcome if we are to care about the means by which it is achieved.
Several sections of the Enquiry are devoted to
utility, the first and most important of the four kinds of virtue,
which Hume calls “virtuous because useful.” He also addresses benevolence
and its role in the moral process. Specifically, Hume says that
benevolent acts are virtuous because they are useful to many others.
Analysis
Because he locates the basis of virtue in utility rather
than in God-given reason, Hume’s list of virtues implicitly forms
a rejection of Christian morality. Items such as ambition are vices
under the old model, so Hume’s acceptance of them into his catalog
is an insult to religious theorists. However, Hume is consistent
in his theory that these traits are virtues because they fulfill
his two requirements for moral sentiments: they must be useful to
ourselves or others, or they must be pleasing to ourselves or others.
Furthermore, Hume rejects the concept of morality as strictly voluntary.
Instead, he divides his list into voluntary and involuntary virtues,
claiming that separating them is necessary only when devising a
system of reward and punishment. He is not interested in creating
or endorsing such a system, so he makes no such distinctions in
his moral philosophy.
