Rather than asking for a declaration of war from Congress, Truman opted to claim
that he was sending ships and planes at the request of the UN. This allowed
Truman, rather than Congress, to take credit for responding to the Communist
threat. Indeed, Congress, the Press, and the Gallup Polls all responded very
favorably to Truman's policies. One side-effect that few considered was the
following: since the 7TH Fleet was barring the PRC from invading Formosa, the
PRC transferred most of its army to Shantung province, a location from which it
would be easy to quickly become involved in the Korean conflict.
The UN force that went to Korea was the first-ever "international peace-keeping
force." But although its ideology of peace and non-aggression seem very
positive, the peacekeeping force was in this case actually an instrument of the
US. Only 16 countries actually sent men on the mission, and most of these were
NATO countries, which were hardly neutral when it
came to Communists. And the majority of the troops by a good margin were
American: while 5.7 million American troops would ultimately serve in the Korean
War, only about 40,000 troops from the other UN Peace-Keeping nations were
involved, and of these, half were British. In fact, the tiny non-American units
actually tended to get in the way and confuse American planning more than they
actually helped the war effort. Chiang Kai-Shek
offered 35,000 Chinese
Nationalist troops, but Truman and Acheson rejected this, afraid the
involvement of Chinese Nationalists might provoke the involvement of the much
larger Red Army of the PRC. Clearly, the UN forces were an instrument of US
policy designed to give the appearance of international consensus rather than a
truly autonomous international organization.
MacArthur's call for American ground troops was based on several factors. First
of all, bad weather was limiting the accuracy of air power to defend the South
Koreans. Second, the ROK troops could not now be given tanks and be expected to
use them: only well trained US soldiers could operate the tanks and anti-tank
weapons necessary to halt the advance of the Soviet T-34s operated by North
Korean fighters.
Although Truman did not immediately give MacArthur all the troops he wanted,
once some ground troops were committed to Korea, it was inevitable that more
would follow. Once committed in this battle against Communism, the US could not
afford to lose for fear of losing its credibility with all of its allies,
especially the NATO powers. The same scenario would play out a decade later in
Vietnam. In this way, like a brush fire, "Limited Wars" in the modern-era often
proved (and prove) very difficult to contain, to keep "limited."
The American troops MacArthur brought in from Japan had not seen fighting in
years, if ever. An occupation army, most of these troops were under-trained and
out of shape. As he held on to Pusan, MacArthur's forces became more and more
fit. The intense heat of summer was also a problem, and American morale was
extremely low during this period. The worst was seen in "bug-out fever", where
US troops would flee battle, throwing down weapons as they ran. The North
Korean troops were battle-hardened veterans by comparison, used to the terrain,
formidable fighters, and highly mobile. Once more, in the comparison of North
Korean quick-strike capabilities and firm resolve versus an under-motivated and
slow to react American army, this early phase of the Korean War foreshadowed the
Vietnam War. Also, as in Vietnam, strategic bombing, which had played such a
vital part in World War II, never worked very well against North Korea, which
simply wasn't industrialized enough for bombing to have a devastating impact.
