Socrates and Meno (and Anytus, who is largely silent from here
on) have now concluded that virtue is at least partly a kind of
wisdom, but that even the most beneficent men are not virtuous only out of
knowledge (as evidenced by the fact that none of them seem capable of
teaching it). This last point, suggests Socrates, is one reason why he
and Meno may have failed to find virtue itself in considering such
virtuous men. This suggestion puzzles Meno, and Socrates explains that,
while they had been looking for virtue as a kind of teachable
knowledge, virtuous men's good deeds could equally well be the
result not of knowledge but of "true opinion."
Socrates gives the example of a guide on the road to Larissa: whether the
guide has knowledge of the way or a true opinion about the way, the result
is the same (a successful trip to Larissa). But if this is the case, asks
Meno, "why is knowledge prized far more highly than right opinion, and why
are they different?"
Socrates' answer gives the metaphor of a man who possesses a valuable
sculpture by Daedalus. If the statue is "tied down," it is of lasting
value. If, however, it is not tied down, it won't last long and is
therefore of less good. Similarly, true opinions "are not willing to
remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth
much until one ties them down by giving "an account of the reason
why" the opinion is true [my italics]. Such an account allows true
opinion to become knowledge through the process of "recollection"
discussed earlier, and so to become fixed in the mind. Nonetheless, at
least in terms of directing actions at given times, true opinion serves as
well as knowledge.
Socrates and Meno now face a final problem: they have concluded both that
virtue cannot be taught and that it is not innate (both parties agree that
neither knowledge nor true opinion can be innate). So, returning to the
question that opened the dialogue, how do men become virtuous? Plato
(through Socrates) is content to leave this a mystery of sorts for now,
concluding only that virtuous statesmen are only so through a sort of
divine inspiration, like "soothsayers and prophets. They too say many
true things when inspired, but they have no knowledge of what they
are saying" [my italics].
Thus, virtue is left as "a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by
understanding." Though this deep uncertainty may not seem like much of an
end to the dialogue, the apparent emptiness of Socrates' conclusion is
mitigated by the importance of the lack of knowledge in and of itself.
Socrates has succeeded in convincing two prominent citizens and men of
politics not only that they have no understanding of virtue, but also that
no one does. This state of uncertainty, or aporia, the
state of knowing that one does not know, is a major Platonic theme, and
clears the ground for the pursuit of a kind of truth far more exacting and
rigorous than had been previously sought.
The Meno ends as Socrates bids his interlocutors farewell,
reminding them once more that they must seek to know what virtue is (and,
according to him, they'd be the first to truly know) before finding out
how it comes to be in men. Departing, Socrates tells Meno to teach
Anytus what he has learned today.
