Summary
There are three bad states of character: vice, incontinence,
and brutishness. Opposite to these three are virtue, continence,
and superhuman virtue. We now examine incontinence and softness,
or effeminacy, and their opposites, continence and endurance.
A great deal of inconsistency exists among popular views
about incontinence. How does incontinence arise: is it through ignorance or
in full knowledge? With respect to what are people incontinent? How
does incontinence differ from vices like licentiousness?
Aristotle proposes four solutions. First, it is possible
that a person knows what is wrong but does not reflect upon this
knowledge, and so does wrong without thinking about it. Second,
the incontinent person may make a false inference when using the
practical syllogism due to ignorance of the facts. Third, the incontinent
person may be emotionally excited or mentally disturbed and therefore unable
to think clearly. Fourth, desire may cause a person to act hastily
without self-restraint or more careful reasoning.
A person who shows excessive desire for the pleasures
of victory, honor, or wealth is called incontinent with qualification:
“incontinent with respect to victory,” for example. By contrast,
a person who shows excessive desire for bodily pleasure, such as
sex or food, is simply called incontinent without qualification.
Incontinence with qualification is not real incontinence, but is
only called incontinence by analogy to incontinence without qualification.
Licentiousness and incontinence are closely connected, though the licentious
person acts out of choice while the incontinent person lacks such
self-control.
It is more forgivable to be incontinent as a result of
temper than desire. A person with a short temper is reasonable up
to a point, but the person who gives in to desire is entirely unreasonable.
Furthermore, being incontinent is better than being licentious,
since it is better to do bad things from lack of self-control than
from conscious choice. Continence is preferable to endurance, since
continence involves conquering the pull of desires rather than just
enduring them. The opposite of endurance is softness or effeminacy,
where a person is unable to bear the sorts of pains most people
can.
The licentious person is more easily reformed than the
incontinent person, because he or she acts from choice and can be
reasoned with. The licentious person is wicked, while the incontinent
person does wicked things without being willfully wicked.
Many philosophers are critical of pleasure. Some say that
pleasure is always bad, arguing that temperate and prudent people
avoid pleasure, that pleasure clouds sensible thought and distracts
us from our proper ends. Others say that some pleasures are disgraceful
or harmful. Yet others say that pleasure cannot be the supreme good, since
it is not an end in itself, but a process.
Aristotle responds that pleasure is an activity, hence
an end, not a process. Pleasure is harmful only in a limited sense,
while the highest pleasures, such as contemplation, are not harmful
in any sense. In fact, achieving the supreme end of a good life
is a pleasurable activity, and we seek the good life precisely because
it is pleasurable. This kind of pleasure is the highest good of
all. Pleasures of the body are bad only if taken to excess. Nonetheless,
pleasures of the mind are preferrable.
Analysis
Socrates claimed that no one knowingly does wrong. In
his view, any wrongdoing results from ignorance of one kind or another.
The goal of moral education, then, is to ensure that everyone knows what
is good and why it is good so that no one will be susceptible to the
sorts of ignorance that lead to wrongdoing.
Aristotle accepts Socrates’ thesis but realizes that it
calls for some detailed elaboration. Not all bad behavior is the
same, so there must be various kinds of ignorance, some more culpable
than others.
Aristotle identifies three major sources of wrongdoing:
vice, incontinence, and brutishness. Vice is the opposite of virtue.
Like virtue, it is developed from a young age through habit and
practice. Also like virtue, vice is a disposition to behave in a
certain way. A person with the virtue of temperance is disposed
to behave temperately and will think of temperance as the correct
form of behavior. By contrast, a person with the vice of licentiousness
is deposed to behave licentiously, and will think of this licentiousness
as the correct form of behavior. Vice is therefore the worst of
the three sources of wrongdoing, since a person who acts out of
vice acts voluntarily and deliberately: having thought about a particular
act, this person has decided that it is the right thing to do.
The incontinent person differs from the vicious person,
then, in that the incontinent person knows what is good but does
wrong anyway. An incontinent person might have the virtue
of temperance and know that licentious behavior is blameworthy,
but still lack the self-control to resist licentious behavior. Incontinence
is not as bad as vice, since it is more a form of weakness than
actual moral badness.
Brutishness is an extreme form of irrational wrongdoing.
A brute lacks the capacity for rational thought altogether and so
has no sense of what is right or wrong. With characteristically
Greek xenophobia, Aristotle suggests that brutishness is most common
among non-Greeks but remarks that brutish behavior can also be found
in the mentally ill and other unbalanced characters.
“Incontinence” is a vague definition of the Greek word akrasia, which
is more accurately but more cumbersomely translated as “lacking
self-control.” Akrasia is particularly puzzling
for anyone who accepts Socrates’ claim, since the person who does
wrong out of akrasia does so with full knowledge
of the wrongdoing. If Socrates is right and no one knowingly does
wrong, how are we to account for akrasia?
Akrasia involves giving in to guilty
pleasures, so it should come as no surprise that we find an analysis
of pleasure in the book that deals with akrasia. Aristotle
is much more approving of pleasure than Plato and Plato’s followers,
and he defends pleasure on a number of counts. According to Plato,
pleasure comes from a process of restoration. For instance, we get
pleasure from eating because we are restoring our bodies from a
state of hunger to a state of satiation. For Plato, then, pleasure
cannot possibly be the supreme good, since it is only good at all
when we are in a less than ideal state. At best, it is a process
that helps us reach a better state, but then we should value that
better state and not the process that leads us there.
Aristotle disagrees fundamentally with Plato’s analysis
of pleasure, arguing that it is an activity, or energeia, and
not a process. For instance, we get pleasure from listening to good
music not because listening brings us to some desirable end state,
but because listening is an activity worthwhile in itself. Recall
that in Book I, Aristotle also describes happiness as an activity.
For Aristotle, the good life is not an end state that we are constantly
striving for, but rather a way of living that consists of habitually
virtuous activities. Pleasure is not incidental to the good life;
it is the feeling of satisfaction we have when living well.
Only truly virtuous people take pleasure in the right
things, however. Neither the incontinent nor the continent
person has this kind of virtue. Both have formed bad habits and
are tempted to take pleasure in the wrong sorts of activities. The
continent person differs from the incontinent in that he or she
is able to control these temptations.
Akrasia, then, is a result of poorly
formed habits, like vice. Unlike vice, though, akrasia involves
an intellectual understanding of what is right. In Aristotle’s view,
it is possible to do wrong while knowing what is right, because
the intellect does not always have full control over the mind’s
lower functions. In this respect, Aristotle represents a modification
of the Socratic view, maintaining still that wrongdoing consists
of a kind of ignorance, but suggesting also that perfect rationality
is not a foolproof shield against wrongdoing.
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